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I. INTRODUCTION
he has decided that she has the right to do the wrong thing.
It is, after all, her death."' Alice Hoffman's words from her
novel illumination Night embody the legal principles of
bodily integrity and autonomy.' The words could be modified to "She has
decided that she has the right to do the wrong thing. It is, after all, her life,"
and still retain their legal vitality The right of bodily integrity and its
companion, the right to refuse medical treatment, are well-ingrained in
American jurisprudence These rights protect a person's ability to control
ALICE HOFFMAN, ILLUMINATION NIGHT 161 (1987).
2 This protection from unwelcome bodily intrusion has roots as far back as
fourteenth century English common law. See F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF
ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 56 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J.
Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1909).
1 "Individual freedom here is guaranteed only if people are given the right to
make choices which would generally be regarded as foolish ones." 2 FOWLER V.
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.2, at 61 (Supp. 1968).
1 "The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient
generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment." Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,270 (1990). One commentator refers to
the obsession and preoccupation with autonomy, asserting that "courts... seem
almost frantic in insisting on its preeminent role." Rebecca Dresser, Missing
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what is done to his or her body and have been expanded to include the
making of prospective choices throughthe vehicle of advance directives for
medical care.' This Article explores the extension of advance directives to
psychiatric treatment.
6
First, this Article traces the extension of the right to refuse treatment
to the psychiatric realm. Next, the Article addresses advance directives for
health care8 and their utility for mental health issues Then, the Article
examines state statutory and judicial responses to mental health advance
directives.'0 Finally, the Article analyzes why the right to control future
psychiatric treatment, including the right to refuse treatment, has been slow
to gain acceptance." Although mental health advance directives present
real challenges, legally and otherwise, this Article concludes that they are
firmly rooted in the law and their rejection is, more often than not, based
on illegitimate grounds.
Persons: Legal Perceptions oflncompetent Patients, 46 RUTGERs L. REV. 609, 611
(1994).
1 As the making of future choices often involves the decision to refuse
treatment, the right to refuse and advance directives are directly connected. This
is especially true with respect to advance directives for mental health decisions.
6 There have been several writings on this topic over the last two decades. See
generally Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy
Analysis ofthe Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 777
(1982); Thomas S. Szasz, The Psychiatric Will: A New Mechanism for Protecting
Persons Against "Psychosis" and Psychiatry, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 762 (1982);
Bruce L Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for Those with Mental Illness, 51
U. MIAMI L. REV. 57 (1996).
7 See infra notes 12-112 and accompanying text
S This tool has several names, including "durable power of attorney for health
care" and "health care proxies." Advance directives became increasingly popular
after the Cruzan decision highlighted their utility. Further, in 1990, Congress
passed the Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (1994), which
requires health care providers to inquire of patients whether they have executed an
advance directive.
9 See infra notes 113-286 and accompanying text
"'See infra notes 287-343 and accompanying text.
nSee infra notes 344-98 and accompanying text This reluctance to endorse
mental health advance directives has been recognized elsewhere. See Lester .
Perling, Comment, Health Care Advance Directives: Implications for Florida
Mental Health Patients, 48 U. MIAmI L. REV. 193, 197 (1993). The comment
suggests that the not-so-secret desire to control persons with mental illness may be
one of the reasons that mental health advance directives are not fully embraced. See
id.
2000-2001)
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I. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
A. General Principles
The right to bodily integrity originated centuries ago 2 and led to the
right of informed consent 13 and the right to refuse treatment. 4 The right to
refuse treatment has developed and expanded slowly over a period of
decades and is now bedrock legal doctrine.'5 It applies to different medical
conditions, including psychiatric care. 6
The right to refuse treatment does not evaporate upon the loss of
competence. 7 Although incompetent persons lack the present ability to
12 Maitland traces its roots to fourteenth century English common law. See
MAITLAND, supra note 2, at 56. In an early case regarding the right to bodily
integrity in this country, Judge Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body." Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914),
overruled on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
11 See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
424 (Mass. 1977) (stating that "[o]ne means by which the law has developed in a
manner consistent with the protection ofthis interest [ofbodily integrity] is through
the development of the doctrine of informed consent"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (Sth ed. 1984).
14 SeeIn re President and Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (Miller, J., dissenting); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221-23
(N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J. 1976).
1s The evolution of the right involved its application to increasingly complicated
medical situations. Over time, the right extended to persons who were not
terminally ill and to persons not presently competent to exercise the right. See
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,276 (1990); John F. Kennedy
Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984); Guardianship
of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Mass. 1992); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 657. Courts
have differed on the basis for the right. Some have found a liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 262. Others have found the right
to repose in privacy interests. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 424. To say that there
is a right is not to suggest it is absolute. For a discussion of when the right can be
abridged, see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
16 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133-35 (1992); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 221-23 (1990); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653-54 (1st Cir.
1980).
" The terms competent and incompetent are open to a host of meanings and
synonyms. See Winick, supra note 6, at 66. A helpful distinction, adopted for this
paper, is the concept of competence as a legal status-whether or not a court
adjudication is actually involved. See John W. Parry, The Court's Role in
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decide and to instruct medical caregivers, they still possess the right, which
maybe exercised in one of two ways. The first, which is the concern of this
Article, is through the vehicle of advance directives. The second option is
the doctrine of substituted judgment, a process by which a third party
attempts to discover what an incompetent person would have decided if
competent.18 Although incompetent persons have the right to refuse
treatment, the exercise of the right for that group of persons is more
difficult than it is for competent persons. 19
B. The Extension of the Right to Refiuse Treatment to Psychiatry
1. Introduction
The right to refuse treatment exists as surely for psychiatric illness as
it does for physical illness. 20 Various courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Decisionmaking Involving Incompetent Refiusals of Life-Sustaining Care and
Psychiatric Medications, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 468, 468
(1990). Incapacity is the medical condition of the person that leads to a conclusion
or declaration of incompetence. See id. Further, competence is often considered a
legal determination, while capacity is a medical determination. See id.
Unfortunately, however, these terms are interchanged indiscriminately, including
in places, such as statutes, where precise language matters. The type of advance
directive selected may control how the directive takes effect, through a court
determination of incompetence orby one or more physicians determining a lack of
decision-making capacity. See Alan D. Lieberson, Advance Medical
Directives-1998: A Medical View, 12 QUINNIPIAC PROB. LJ. 305,329 (1998).
Is The substituted judgment approach is an effortto preserve personal autonomy
and bodily integrity, as it focuses on what a person would have chosen, if
competent, as contrasted to what is in the person's best interest. In recognizing the
subjectivity of medical choices, the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Peter
stated:
Medical choices are private, regardless of whether a patient is able to make
them personally or must rely on a surrogate. They are not to be decided by
societal standards of reasonableness or normalcy. Rather, it is the patient's
preferences-formed by his or her unique personal experiences--that
should control.
In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 423 (N.J. 1987). The court further explained that the
privacy accorded to medical decisions "does not vary with the patient's condition"
and that the condition is relevant only to the determination of competence. Id.
19 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cnuzan, which established the right on a
federal constitutional level, noted the differences and concerns present when the
right is being applied to an incompetent. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-81.
2
1 See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133-35; Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-23; Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480,493-94 (1980).
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Court, have over the past four decades carved out rights for persons with
mental illness." Implicit or explicit in these decisions is the right to refuse
the forced administration of psychotropic drugs.' The right has been
recognized in a variety of contexts, the most controversial being involun-
tary civil commitments. Courts are divided on this issue, but many have
held that even persons institutionalized through involuntary commitment
proceedings retain the right to refuse the forced administration of psycho-
tropic drugs' or other involuntary treatment.24
The existence of the right helps shape the debate, of course, but it raises
more questions than it answers. For instance, what is the basis for and
extent of this right? Is it a common law' or constitutional right?2 And if
the right is a constitutional right, does it rise to the level of affundamental
2 1 See Foucba v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-80 (1992); Vitek, 445 U.S. at 487-
94; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-33 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 572-76 (1975).
2 See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 480, 491-94. For a partial listing of articles and
commentary on the topic, see In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 350-51 (Ill. 1994). The
right to refuse further treatment extends to electroconvulsive therapy. See In re
Hatsuye T., 689 N.E.2d 248 (111. App. Ct. 1997); In re Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544,
545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); see also infra Part IV.B.
' Psychotropic drugs are defined as "pharmacological agents used to treat
psychiatric disorders." 2 KAPLAN AND SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 2241 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000).
The terms "psychotropic drugs," "psychoactive drugs," and "psychotherapeutic
drugs" may be used interchangeably. See id.
' See Walters v. W. State Hosp., 864 F.2d 695, 697-98 (10th Cir. 1988); Davis
v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 925-39 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rivers v. Katz, 495
N.E.2d 337, 341-42 (N.Y. 1986). For a listing of literature on the subject, see
Alexander D. Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications: Law and
Policy, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 339, 339 n.1 (1987).
2 See Jessica Litmnan, Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication
of the Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1720 (1982).
2' Professor Richard Bonnie suggests that the right to refuse psychiatric
medication derives not from the common law (as does the general right to refuse,
which has its basis in malpractice doctrine), but rather from constitutional rights
identified during the 1970s respecting persons with mental illness. See Richard
J. Bonnie, The Psychiatric Patient's Right to Refuse Medication: A Survey of
the Legal Issues, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS:
VALUES IN CONFLICT 19, 19-21 (A. Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey eds.,
1982). Of course, this was written well before the Cruzan case constitutionalized
on a federal level the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
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one?27 Some have suggested First Amendment protections? and the U.S.
Supreme Court has found a liberty interest in the prison context.29
Regardless ofthe source, are there circumstances under which the right can
be abridged? If so, when?
2. Development of the Right
More than two decades ago, the cases ofRennie v. Klein30 and Rogers
v. Okin" significantly advanced the right to refuse psychiatric treatment.
These cases are a good starting point to understand the right to refuse
mental health treatment.
John Rennie, a divorced former pilot and flight instructor,32 was
diagnosed as aperson with paranoid schizophrenia.33 He had been admitted
2 In Riggins v. Nevada, although the Court did not specifically reach the issue,
the Court did suggest that perhaps the right is fundamental. See Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127, 133-38 (1992). Some commentators have argued and some courts
have held that the right to refuse is indeed fundamental. See Davis, 506 F. Supp.
at 934; William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of
Protection for Psychiatic Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REv. 937, 989-93
(1998); Winick, supra note 6, at 63-64.
1 See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No ". A History and Analysis
ofthe Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 319-26 (1992). In
Rennie v. Klein, the trial court rejected the First and Eighth Amendments as
grounds for the right. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143-44 (D.N.J.
1978). In Rogers v. Okin, however, a federal district court found that First
Amendment rights were implicated. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-
67 (D. Mass. 1979).
29See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127; Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
3' Rennie v. Klein had a rather complicated procedural history. See Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.L 1978) (denying preliminary injunction); Rennie
v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.L 1979), stay granted by 481 F. Supp. 552
(D.NJ. 1979), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated by 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. granted,judgmentvacated by 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), remanded to 720
F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
31 Like Rennie, Rogers v. Okin was procedurally complicated. See Rogers v.
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified by 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. by Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982),
remanded to and modified by Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).32 This level of detail, while perhaps appearing irrelevant, helps to underscore
the power of labels and stigma. Mr. Rennie was more than just mentally ill. The
reader is likely to have a different more favorable reaction towards Mr. Rennie if
he is described with the common, humanizing characteristic of being divorced and
as having the skills necessary to be a flight instructor, rather than just labeled as a
"paranoid schizophrenic," with all the fears that diagnosis summons. See infra
notes 360-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of sanism.
33Rennie, 653 F.2d at 838.
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a dozen times to the state hospital in New Jersey and had been both
involuntarily committed and involuntarily medicated.34 During his
involuntary commitment, Mr. Rennie filed suit against various state actors,
alleging that the administration of antipsychotic drugs against his will was
a violation of his constitutional rights.
35
After several proceedings at the federal district court level, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that persons involuntarily committed
to state mental hospitals retain a Fourteenth Amendment due process
liberty interest to refuse antipsychotic drugs that have the potential to cause
permanent and disabling side effects.36 The court declared "that there is a
difference of constitutional significance between simple involuntary
confinement to a mental institution and commitment combined with
enforced administration of antipsychotic drugs."37 Forced medication
"implicates the 'right to be free from... unjustified intrusions on personal
security.' 38 Not surprisingly, it found that the right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs was not absolute and could be abridged at times based upon the valid
exercise of the state's police or parens patriae power, provided it was done
with the least intrusive infringement on the right.39
A year later in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court .vacated the court
of appeals's opinion and remanded4 for further consideration in light
of Youngberg v. Romeo,4' a case involving the involuntary physical
restraint of an institutionalized patient.42 The Court in Youngberg
rejected-or, at a minimum, found inapplicable-the least intrusive means
standard and, instead, carved out a standard of review of mental health
treatment decisions that was quite deferential to professional medical
decision-maldng.43 On remand, the First Circuit issued a splintered deci-
3 Id.
35 See id. at 838-39.
36 See id. at 838-44.
37 Id. at 844.
381 Id. (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,673 (1977)).
39Id. at 845.
'0 Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
4, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
42 See id. at 311.
43 See id. at 323. Youngberg's professional judgment standard has led to much
consternation in patient-advocate circles, as it affords significant discretion to
medical determinations and permits judicial reversal only if a decision is not made
consistent with standards of professional judgment. See id. Although Youngberg
was not decided in a refusal to medicate setting, it has been so applied. See Morgan
v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 697-98 (8th Cir. 1997). In discussing the defendant Dr.
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sion." Six judges found Youngberg's professional judgment standardto be
controlling-albeit with differing standardsS--and three found that the
Court's rejection of the least intrusive means test in the physical restraint
context of Youngberg did not extend to the forced intake of psychotropic
drugs upon the institutionalized mentally ill, as was the case in Rennie.4 '
Reduced to its essentials, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that there was a "qualified" constitutional right to refuse psychiatric
treatment and that New Jersey law did not violate those rights.
At about the same time, a similar battle was taking place in the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit. In Rogers v. Okin,47 the named plaintiff,
Rubie Rogers, and a class of individuals who were then living or had
previously lived at a Massachusetts state mental health facility sued for
damages and injunctive relief based upon the forced administration of
antipsychotic drugs.48 The First Circuit upheld what it declared to be "an
intuitively obvious proposition"--that each individual has the right to be
free to decide whether that individual wants to receive antipsychotic
drugs.49 Although the court noted that the direct source of the right was
ambiguous and that direct authority for the right was scarce, it nonethe-
less found the right to be lurking within the Fourteenth Amendment, as
part of the penumbral rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and personal
security5s
The court further declared that the right to refuse was not absolute and
could be overridden by a valid exercise of the state's police power after an
individualized balancing test weighing the rights of the individual against
the state's interest in preventing violence demonstrated that the latter
interest outweighs the former and that there are no less restrictive means
Rabun's forcible injection ofpsychotropic drugs into the plaintiffpatient, the court
stated that "we must simply make certain that Dr. Rabun exercised professional
judgment' and that "[w]e start from a presumption that the decisions made by
professionals are correct." Id. at 697-98. Some advocates have therefore concluded
that state courts provide friendlier forums than do federal courts because state
courts may more strictly scrutinize institutional decisions to forcibly medicate in
the context of competent refusals.44 Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
4S See id. at 266-74.
4
1 See id. at 274-77.
47 Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
11 Id. at 653.
49 Id. Indeed, the court stated that neither the parties nor any amici took issue
with this general legal proposition. Id. at 654.
50Id. at 653.
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available.1 On the other hand, the state's parens patriae power could be
used to override an individual's refusal to submit to medication only when
there was a determination of incapacity of the individual.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Rogers case to answer one
question: does an involuntarily committed mental patient have a constitu-
tional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs?l The Court
declined to answer the question, however, because an intervening
Massachusetts state case, Guardianship ofRoe,-4 premised upon both state
and federal law, could have changed the result of the court of appeals's
decision.55 Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a
decision by the court of appeals as to whether Roe required it to revise its
holdings or to certify state-law questions to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court.
56
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit then certified nine questions
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which found that state law
created rights for involuntarily committed persons that included the right
to make medical determinations.Y If patients were found to be
incompetent,58 they would be entitled to substituted judgment decision-
making.59 Under this process, the decision made would be the one that,
after investigation, is believed to be the one that the patient would make,
and not a decision based upon a more objective "best interests" standard.6
After the Massachusetts court ruled, the First Circuit took up the case
again. Another intervening U.S. Supreme Court decision complicated
matters, however, by stripping federal courts of their power to order
injunctive relief compelling state officials to comply with state law.6
51 See id. at 656-57.
- See id. at 657.
- Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,293 (1982).
- Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981). The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court found that there was a protected liberty interest in deciding
whether or not to submit to antipsychotic drugs and held that that interest could be
overridden only by an overwhelming state interest. Id. at 51 & n.9.
55 Mills, 457 U.S. at 300-06.
51 See id. at 306.
51 See Rogers v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 310
(Mass. 1983).
5
1 The state court declared that competency decisions were within the province
of judicial decision-makers rather than medical decision-makers. See id.
P See id
6°Seeid. at 316.61SeePermhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,97-106 (1984).
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Accordingly, the First Circuit merely outlined the state substantive and
procedural rights as enunciated in Roe and then concluded that those state
rights rose above the federal constitutional floor.62 Because the state rights
were higher, there was little utility, the court said, in identifying and
compelling adherence to the lower set of federal constitutional standards. 63
Thus, after convoluted litigation paths, the Rennie court found a
"qualified" right to refuse treatment for the involuntarily institutionalized
mentally ill and the Rogers court made no assessment of the federal
constitutional right, having found that Massachusetts standards exceeded
federal standards. 64 Notwithstanding this flurry of activity between the U.S.
Supreme Court and the two courts of appeals in the early 1980s, the Court
ultimately provided no clear answer to the explicit question whether a
person who has been involuntarily civilly committed has a constitutional
right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs.
Other state and federal lower courts have since joined the Courts of
Appeals for the First and Third Circuits in determining that there is a right
to refuse forcedtreatment with antipsychotic drugs. 65 Although due process
is the usual basis, some courts have used other grounds. In State ex rel.
Jones v. Gerhardstein,l for instance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
declined to reach the due process issue after it found a violation of equal
protection.67 The court found "beyond a reasonable doubt an irrational
disparity of rights" afforded to persons involuntarily committed.68 This
disparity, which yielded the equal protection violation, occurred because
pre-trial detainees in the criminal system retained a right to informed
consent, whereas civilly committed persons did not.69 In general, although
the right to refuse psychiatric treatment is now clear, there is still much
debate around its edges, specifically regarding the questions of when and
how it can be overridden. 0
62See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 6-9 (1st Cir. 1987).
6 See id. at 9.
' For a comprehensive discussion of the Rennie andRogers cases, see Brooks,
supra note 27, at 939-63.
' See, e.g., Jurasek v. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506 (10th Cir. 1998); State
ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987).
6Jones, 416 N.W.2d at 883.
67 See id. at 892-93.
68 I.
6 See id.
70 Even if a court acknowledges the right, that does not necessarily mean a
victory for the mentally ill person. In Jurasek v. Utah State Hospital, the court
upheld summary judgment in favor of the hospital in the face of due process
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While avoiding pronouncements on the specific issue, the Supreme
Court has issued opinions in several other cases concerning persons with
mental illness that have shed light on its views. There is clearly a substan-
tial liberty interest in avoiding commitment to a mental institution."1
Furthermore, there is a right to be free ofthe unwarranted and stigmatizing
effects of being labeled mentally ill, even if one has already been branded
a criminal. 2 And there is a significant due process liberty interest in
escaping the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs in the criminal
justice arena.'
3. The Right to Refuse Treatment in Penal Institutions
The U.S. Supreme Court has twice spoken clearly about the right to
refuse psychiatric treatment in penal settings. In Washington v. Harper,4
the Court declared that a prisoner has the right to be free from the forced
administration of unwanted drugs.75 The Harper Court differed from other
court decisions as to the basis of the right, however; it is grounded, wrote
Justice Kennedy, in a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest,76 not in a
constitutional right of privacy, as other courts have found.'
Although Harper established that there is a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing psychotropic medication in penal'settings, the
actual holding was a defeat for the inmate who had brought suit. Walter
Harper, the plaintiff, was convicted of robbery and, after sentencing, was
placed in the mental health unit of the prison where he voluntarily received
antipsychotic drugs.' After Harper was paroled, he assaulted two nurses at
a hospital and subsequently had his parole revoked. Once more he
consented to medication prescribed for his manic depression. 9 Harperthen
violation claims. Jurasek v. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506, 509 (10th Cir. 1998).
Central to the court's holding was a finding during the commitment proceeding that
the patient was unable to make rational treatment decisions and was, therefore,
according to the court, incompetent. See id. at 513.
71 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
7 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-94 (1980).
73See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washingtonv. Harper, 494 U.S.
210 (1990).
74 Harper, 494 U.S. at 210.
75 See id. at 219-27.
76 See id. at 221-22.
77 See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d
266 (3d Cir. 1983).
7 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 213-14.
71 See id. at 214.
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withdrew his consent, however, and the prison sought to force medication
upon him in accordance with prison policy." The policy recognized
substantive and procedural rights for inmates who objected to treatment
with antipsychotic drugs, but Harper took issue with particulars of the
policy, asserting that he was entitled to a judicial hearing to determine
whether he could be forcibly medicated against his will.8' The Washington
Supreme Court agreed, holding that "a competent, nonconsenting inmate"
was entitled to a judicial hearing with "the full panoply of adversarial
procedural protections" and that to override an inmate's wishes, the state
was required to establish by "'clear, cogent, and convincing' evidence that
the administration of antipsychotic medication was both necessary and
effective for furthering a compelling state interest.
'8 2
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the holding, however, finding that
the state policy of affording only an administrative hearing was sufficient
to satisfy Harper's constitutional rights.' Although there was "no doubt,"
the Court declared, that an inmate possesses a protected liberty interest in
preventing the forced administration of antipsychotic drgs,14 due process
requires a neutral factfinder, not a judicial one.85 Further, the Court
suggested that an inmate's medical needs might be better served by having
the decision made by medical professionals.86 The Court then declared that
a lay advocate "who understands the psychiatric issues involved is
sufficient" to protect the inmate's interests, thereby rejecting the Washing-
ton Supreme Court's mandate of counsel.8 7
The Court also explicitly rejected Harper's contention that his right to
refuse could be overridden only if he were found incompetent.8 Linking
the breadth of his right to his confinement, the Court stated that Harper's
80 See id.
81 See id. at 215-17. The policy provided for administrative hearings. See id. at
215-16. Harper made further arguments based on free speech principles, but that
argument was not considered by either the Washington Supreme Court or the U.S.
Supreme Court. See id. at 218 n.5. Arguments against forced treatment with
antipsychotic medications occasionally raise the free speech argument, on the
theory that permitting the government to alter one's thinking process, a clear
outcome of antipsychotic medications, violates First Amendment rights.82Id. at 218.
83 Id. at 228.
84 Id. at 221-22.
85 See id. at 231.
86 See id. at 231-32.
87 Id. at 236.
88Id. at 222.
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due process rights were met by state policy that authorized forced
medication only if a mental disorder existed that, if untreated, would cause
harm, and that required medication was prescribed by a psychiatrist and
sanctioned by a second reviewing psychiatrist.89
The Harper holding is simultaneously broad and narrow. First, it
establishes that the right to refuse treatment is powerful enough to apply
even to those who are deprived of their physical liberty.90 Its broad scope
may be likened to the holding in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health,91 where the Court declared that the right to refuse treatment is
powerful enough to apply even to those who lack competence. 92 Thus,
although the right might be qualified, it applies initially to a vast popula-
tion, including the incarcerated and the incompetent.
Second, the prison setting of Harper also explains the Court's chary
interpretation of the depth of the right. The Court held that a prisoner had
a due process right to refuse forced psychotropic drugs but that the extent
ofthis right"must be defined in the context ofthe inmate's confinement."' 3
Governmental interest is always elevated in the prison setting and Harper
established that a prisoner's right to refuse could be overcome by a
legitimate penological interest.94 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
rejected the Washington Supreme Court's determination that in order to
forcibly administer mind-altering drugs, a court must find that such drugs
are necessary and effective to achieve a compelling state interest.95 The
89 See id. at 221-23.
9o The Eighth Amendment would, of course, prohibit cruel and unusual
punishment in the prison setting, but Harper applies to compelled medication for
the purpose of treatment, not punishment. See id.
9' Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
92Id. at 279. It is important to remember that in Cruzan the Court assumed, but
did not decide, that there was a right to refuse treatment. Id.
93Harper, 494 U.S. at 222.
4 See id. at 223-24. The Harper reasoning has been used outside the prison
setting. In Jurasek v. Utah State Hospital, the court found that the Harper analysis
applied in the civil commitment setting and authorized forcible medication if a
civilly committed patient is "incompetent to make medical decisions if the patient
is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the patient's medical
interests." Jurasek v. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d. 506, 511 (10th Cir. 1998).
Jurasek also extended Harper by applying it to a person who is not a danger to self
or others but who is gravely disabled. Id. at 512. The Jurasek court, however,
required a finding of incompetence, something that Harper specifically rejected.
Harper, 494 U.S. at 222; Jurasek, 158 F.3d at 511.
95See Harper, 494 U.S. at 220-23.
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Court declared that such a rewriting of the substantive standard was not
required by the Due Process Clause or the rights conferred by the state
policy.96 This conclusion appears to be based largely on the fact of
confinement. Accordingly, although it is notable that Harper was afforded
the right to refuse psychiatric treatment, the correctional setting ofthe case
places clear limitations on the scope of this right?7
The Harper conclusion was reinforced in Riggins v. Nevada," where
the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the forcible administration of
antipsychotic medication was constitutionally forbidden absent the state
showing both the need for and the appropriateness of the drug at issue.9
The Court reiteratedthat due process liberty interests were involved, stating
that the interference with liberty worked by forced antipsychotic medica-
tion was "particularly severe."'" In making this determination, the Court
cited the numerous and dramatic side effects that may well accompany the
benefits ofantipsychotic drugs.'' Those side effects include acute dystonia
(a severe involuntary spasm of the upper body), akathesia (motor restless-
ness), neuroleptic malignant syndrome, andtardive dyskinesia (a frequently
irreversible neurological disorder causing uncontrollable movement). 02
In Riggins, David Riggins was found competent to stand trial on
charges of robbery and murder.0 3 He then sought a court order permitting
him to cease his treatment with the antipsychotic drug Mellaril.' ° This
request was denied, and Riggins was tried and convicted.0 5 On appeal, he
I See id. at 220-22 (rejecting the Washington Supreme Court's imposition of
a requirement that the state show a compelling interest and adopting instead a
standard requiring a mere finding, pursuant to the state prison policy, that the
"inmate is 'gravely disabled' or that he presents a 'serious likelihood of harm to
himself or others"').
I"[P]rison regulations allegedto infringe constitutional rights are judged under
a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged
infringements of fundamental constitutional rights." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
91 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
9Id. at 135.
100Id at 134.
101 Id.
I m Id.
103 Id. at 129-30.
104 Id.
10
5 Id. at 131.
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argued that this forced treatment violated numerous constitutional rights,
including due process liberty interests.' °6 The Nevada Supreme Court
upheld his conviction. 107
In its order reversing and remanding, the U.S. Supreme Court noted
that the brevity of the trial court order denying Riggins's request to be
taken off medication precluded an assessment of whether Harper's
requirement of an overriding justification and finding of medical appropri-
ateness prior to the forced administration of drugs had been met.10 3 In
comparing the case with Harper, the Court noted that a pre-trial detainee
enjoys at least as much Fourteenth Amendment liberty protection as does
a convicted prisoner.109
The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that there is a constitution-
allyprotectedliberty interest in refusing unwantedmedication or treatment,
including psychiatric medication. This interest extends to the criminally
involved, in both the pre-trial" 0 and post-trial phases."' It also embraces
persons who are incompetent."' It is the combination of these two
principles-the right to refuse psychiatric treatment and the right to have
that refusal honored during periods of incompetence, through the instru-
ment of an advance directive-that is examined next.
" Id. at 131-32. Although this case involved, by its most literal terms, synthetic
competence, it did notpresent the issue of whether a defendant rendered competent
through drugs has the right to cease taking drugs, thus becoming incompetent and
untriable. Id. at 136. Justice Kennedy, however, took on this issue with vigor in his
concurrence. See id. at 138-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated
that it was his view that "absent an extraordinary showing by the State, the Due
Process Clause prohibits prosecuting officials from administering involuntary doses
of antipsychotic medicines for purposes of rendering the accused competent for
trial." Id. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107 ld. at 132.
108 Id. at 138.
109 Id. at 135.
"0 SeeRiggins, 504 U.S. at 127.
' See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). It is reassuring to note that
lower courts since Harper and Riggins have not merely rubber-stamped
administrative findings of medical appropriateness and safety. See, for example,
United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam), in which the
court of appeals reversed and remanded a district court's approval of a forced
medication decision made by the Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 10-11. Reversal was
required because the district court finding that the medication was "not only
medically appropriate but also essential to safety" was not supported by the record.
Id. at 13.
1' See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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H. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
A. Primer
An advance directive is a means by which a competent person leaves
instructions regarding what medical treatment that person wants or does not
want, should the person later become incompetent. Using principles of
agency law, the person executing the advance directive-the princi-
pal-gives legal authority to a third person-the agent-to make decisions
regarding the principal's health. The concept of advance directives has
existed for decades,' often under the name of a living will." Early
proposals forpsychiatric or mental health advance directives also date back
decades.
Advance directives garnered new attention after Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department ofHealth,"5 where the value of having an incompe-
tent person's wishes clearly stated before incompetency occurred was
underscored in a sad and dramatic way. The U.S. Supreme Court recog-
nized, presumptively,"6 the constitutionally protected right to refuse
treatment, but upheld a state's right to require that the exercise of that right
be proven by clear and convincing evidence."' The Court reached this
conclusion bybalancingthe individual and state interests involved.118 Also,
the Cruzan decision illustrated the importance of creating written instruc-
tions by noting that a written document is more likely than an oral
statement to satisfy a clear and convincing standard.119
Before discussing advance directives, a threshold question must be
resolved: does the universally recognized120 right to refuse treatment cover
1I In an article written just a year before Cruzan, Professor Nancy Rhoden
argued cogently for acceptance of "prior directives" or "living wills" (the phrase
"advance directive" was not yet in the lexicon). See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits
ofLegal Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 845, 860 (1990).
" 4 The term "living -will" is still used today to refer to instructional directives.
For a discussion of instructional versus proxy directives, see infra Part IH.C.1-2.
11 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
116 1d. at 279.
17 Id. at 284.
18 See id. at 279-84.
"9 This is not to say, however, that advance directives are always followed. At
times, this may be warranted, based on concerns about the validity of the particular
instrument. On other occasions, it may be that others-family members or medical
personnel--disagree with the document and thus refuse to give it its proper due.
120 Although universally recognized, the right is not absolute. It can be abridged
for reasons of societal danger and needs of dependent third parties. See ALLEN E.
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future as well as contemporaneous treatment? While the weight of opinion
is that a validly executed advance directive has the equivalent moral and
legal force as a current treatment consent or refusal, a few commentators
posit otherwise. Rebecca Dresser states that "future-oriented treatment
decisions cannot be equated with the active choices of competent
patients."'' She argues that advance directives lack the on going dialogue,
current information, and patient input at the critical moment.'2 Allen
Buchanan and Dan Brock state that because competent persons are not as
good a judge of future situations as they are of the present, and because
there are fewer procedural safeguards for future decision-making, advance
directives do not rise to the level of a contemporaneous choice.In
Another concern raised about the validity of honoring advance
directives is that, in essence, two different persons are involved, the
competentperson who executedthe advance directive andthe subsequently
incompetent person who is subject to it."4 Under this concept of personal
identity," permitting the past "self" to dictate treatment to the present
"self" is paternalistic and, therefore, the advance directive loses its moral
and legal force of self-determination and autonomy. 126
While it is undeniably true that persons evolve, that illness alters, and
that mental illness may alter above all else, the personal identity formula-
tion is problematic. Even if the person in question is in some very real
sense a different "self" from the person who executed the directive, that
prior "self" is still the most logical, least paternalistic person to dictate
BUCHANAN&DANW. BROCK, DECIDING FOROTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE
DECISION MAKING 110 (1989); Rebecca S. Dresser, Advance Directives, Self-
Determination, andPersonal Identity, in ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN MEDICINE 155,
156 (Chris Hackler et al. eds., 1989).
12 Dresser, supra note 120, at 157.
Id.
2 See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 120, at 105-07.
'24 See generally Dresser, supra note 120, at 158. This theory is fully articulated
by Derek Parfit, who suggests that there are two views of personal identity, the
"Simple View" and the "Complex View." Id. Under the latter, if there is not
"psychological continuity" between the current person and the priorperson in areas
such as memories, desires, and values, then there is no identity of self. See id. For
a full discussion, see DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 204-06 (1986)
[hereinafterPARFIT, REASONS ANDPERsoNs]; DerekParfit, LaterSelves andMoral
Principles, in PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL RELATIONS 137, 140 (A. Montefiore
ed., 1973).
125 See PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 124, at 204-06.
12 Dresser, supra note 120, at 160.
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treatment for the present "self." As Professor Nancy Rhoden has said, a
component of respecting persons is viewing them as they view themselves,
which requires that their prior choices and values not be ignored.
12
Moreover, as Rhoden suggests, adopting the view that the incompetent
"self" is not bound by the advance directive of the prior competent "self"
"would wreak societal havoc.' 28 Her observation that a "one body, one
person" rule' 12 9 is necessary for the functioning of civil and criminal law
seems, in the words of the Rogers court, "an intuitively obvious proposi-
tion."'13 Further, the Cruzan decision assumed that the right to refuse
treatment extends to persons during periods of incompetence. 31 This right
has primary meaning in the context of future decisions.
32
Advance directives, now variously known as proxy directives, advance
instructions, instructional directives, or durable powers of attorney,
3 3
resolve the problem presented in Cruzan: they create a means by which
persons can communicate choices for a prospective period of incompe-
tence.
B. The Patient Self-Determination Act
In 1990, Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act
("PSDA), 134 in part as a response to the Cruzan decision. The act requires
all health care facilities receiving Medicare or Medicaid to inform patients
of their decision-making power under state law, including the right to
27Rhoden, supra note 113, at 860.
2 Id. at 854.
129 Id.
130 Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (Ist Cir. 1980).
131 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,279 (1990).
12 It is possible that the medical-treatment wishes of an incompetent person are
current decisions. In some jurisdictions, treatment decisions for an incompetent
person are assessed pursuant to the substituted judgment doctrine. Under this
doctrine, a substituted judgment decision-maker makes treatment decisions for the
incompetent person based upon whatthat decision-makerbelieves the incompetent
person would decide if competent. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch.
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 429 (Mass. 1977). In making this decision, the
substitute decision-maker could assess what the incompetent person would want
presently, without being bound by a prior choice.
" There are other forms of advance directives, such as do-not-resuscitate
orders and organ-donation instruments, that are not directly relevant here. See
Lieberson, supra note 17, at 307-11.
'1 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (1994).
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accept or refuse treatment. 13 Patients must also be given information
regarding their right to execute advance directives. 131 Finally, patients must
be asked, upon admission, if they have an advance directive.137 Thus, the
PSDA ensures that individuals be told of their rights, including advance
directive statutes where they exist. 38
The PSDA has been criticized for not achieving its goal of increasing
the number of patients who have executed advance directives. 13 9 Some
commentators, however, suggest that the PSDA has increased physi-
cians' awareness of and respect for an individual's right to refuse treat-
ment.140
The PSDA has several effects on mental health advance directives.
First, the PSDA includes community mental health centers in its definition
of partial hospitalization services to which the act applies.'' Further, the
PSDA requires notification to the patient of the right to refuse treatment as
well as the relevant state law and the right to execute advance directives
thereunder 4 -- the type of treatment involved is not restricted by the terms
of the statute or its regulations. 43 Therefore, if a particular state's advance
directive law specifically includes mental health care, then the patient must
be so informed.
31Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i).
136 Id.
'37 Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(B).
138 All states now have some form of advance directive or health care proxy
statute. Paul F. Stavis, The Nexum: A Modest Proposal for Self-Guardianship by
Contract, A System ofAdvance Directives and Surrogate Committees-At-Large
for the Intermittently Mentally 1ll, 16 J.CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 43
(1999).
139 See generally Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits ofAdvance
Directives: A History andAssessment ofthe the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 249 (1997) (arguing that the use of advance directives will
be limited and alternative methods of arriving at such medical decisions will be
necessary).
'. Lieberson, supra note 17, at 317-18.
[L]istening to the comments at the hospital Bioethics Committee for the last
nine years, there is clearly a trend toward better appreciation of patient and
family rights to make decisions in these matters by the hospital staff....
Certainly the PSDA does serve to bring the issue out of the legal office and
into the hospital where it belongs.
Id. at318.
141 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(e)(2) (1994).
'
4
1 Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(ii).
14142 C.F.R. § 489.102 (1999).
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In state advance directive statutes where mental health advance
directives are not mentioned, however, what does the PSDA require? Until
those statutes are tested in the courts, there is no dispositive answer. 44
Unless, however, the statute has language limiting the types of medical
decisions specifically to terminal illness or vegetative state situations, even
a generic durable power of attorney for health care ought to cover mental
health care decisions and thus must be explained under the PSDA.
C. Advance Directives for Physical illness
1. Instructional Directives
The instructional directive is a document by which persons spell out
what treatment they desire or refuse in the event that future incompetence
precludes contemporaneous decision-making. It has certain drawbacks,
however. An instructional directive can only dictate that certain procedures
be followed or not; it is often a standard, fill-in-the-blanks form and lacks
flexibility. These limitations have led to suggestions that it is the least
preferable form of advance directives.'45 Further, people cannot accurately
predict advances in health care or what course they will actually want
followed in certain circumstances. When the time comes to act upon the
instructional directive, circumstances and consequences may be wildly
divergent from those existing or imagined at the time of the creation of the
directive."4 Even if circumstances are different, however, it is legally
reasonable and morally appropriate to assume that the principal is more
likely to hit the mark than are third parties interposing their beliefs or their
guesses regarding the principal's beliefs and desires.
2. Proxy Directives
A proxy directive appoints another person 47 as a health care proxy,
also known as an attorney-in-fact. The principal thereby delegates decision-
14 See JOHN PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 105 (5th ed. 1995).
As of 1995, there was one case on point. See In re Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); infra notes 303-12 and accompanying text.
1 45 See Charles P. Sabatino, Ten Legal Myths About Advance Medical
Directives, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 653,653 (1994).
" Note, however, that some jurisdictions attempt to address this problem by
permitting the instructional directive to provide consent to FDA approved drugs
"approved and in existence after [the patient's] declaration and... in the same
class as psychoactive medications as [indicated in the declaration]." See, e.g., TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 137.011 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
47A secondary proxy may be appointed in the eventthe firstproxy is unavailable.
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making authority to a third party instead of committing such decisions to
paper in the form of an instructional directive. The principal may also
provide instructions for the proxy. At least one jurisdiction binds the proxy
to make decisions "consistent with any desires the principal has expressed
in the declaration."'' This concept of health care proxies preceded the
Patient Self-Determination Act by several years and was recommended in
1983 by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine. 149
All states and the District of Columbia have some form of statutory
authority for advanced health care decisions.1 50 Historically, a durable
power of attorney, like a regular power of attorney, covers personal and
financial decisions but, unlike a standard power of attorney, is effective
during periods of a principal's incapacity. It was an easy step to include
medical decision-making, and some states moved to amend their statutes
accordingly. Several states have gone even further and have incorporated
into their statutory scheme provisions for powers of attorney for mental
health decisions.'5 '
3. Combination Directives
A combination of an instructional directive with a proxy directive may
be the most effective way to effectuate an individual's wishes. 5 2 The
drawback of each type of directive is counterbalanced by the presence of
the other. For instance, an instructional directive suffers from its inertness.
Once-written, it is likely to be forgotten and unmodified as advances in
medical technology or changes in life views occur. Then, once needed
when the principal becomes incompetent, it is legally impossible to modify
it. The effect of combining an instructional directive with a proxy directive
141 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.705 (1999).
,49 Paul S. Appelbaum,AdvanceDirectivesforPsychiatric Treatment, 42 HoSP.
& COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 983, 983 (1991).
"I Robert D. Fleischner, Advanced Directives for Mental Health Care: An
Analysis of State Statutes, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 788,790 (1999).
' Such states include Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, and
Oregon. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-2 (Supp. 1999); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
45/4-4(b) (West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-802(i) (West Supp.
2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145C.01(4) (West Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
32A-19(al) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.702(1) (1999).
'2 Sabatino, supra note 145, at 653 ("A... better alternative is to execute both
documents or a single, combined Advance Directive that names a proxy and
provides guidance about one's wishes.").
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is that the proxy can modify the directive based on an understanding of the
principal's wishes.153 The very existence of a proxy can be helpful in
ensuring that the instructional directive is honored by medical personnel.
A proxy directive alone, on the other hand, runs the risk that the
proxy's wishes, not the principal's, will be effectuated. Accordingly, a
proxy directive combined with an instructional directive enhances the
likelihood that the proxy will act as a true agent and ensures that the will
of the principal is observed.
4. Components of an Advance Directive
It is important to define when an advance directive takes effect and
when its authority ceases. Generally, advance directives spring into force
only when the principal becomes incompetent. While still competent, the
principal continues to make decisions.
Determining incompetence can be a vexing task.1UA court declaration
of incompetence, of course, is dispositive. Such determinations are not
commonplace, however. Many state advance directive statutes confer upon
the doctor the right to assess capacity, which in turn can lead to a determi-
nation of incompetence, although more than one doctor may be required to
make the determination. 155 Other states also authorize a judge to make the
competency determination. 5 6 Further complicating the determination,
many state statutes use different terms to mean essentially the same thing.
Competence, capacity, and "of sound mind" are all used in various statutes,
and the varying terms add a layer of confusion." Although courts vary in
their assessment of competence, it is commonly understood to be a legal
and not a medical decision. 15
11 Such a modification would only be necessary if there were significantly
different circumstances.
" Determining competence can be troubling ineitherphysical or mental health
advance directives. In some circumstances, however, the difference is apparent No
one doubts the incompetence of a person in a coma; there is room for debate,
however, with respect to someone in psychiatric distress. See Scott J. Brown,
Advance Directives Move Into Mental Health Care, CLINICALPSYCHIATRYNEWS,
July 1995, at 10, 11.
155 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 43A, § 11-110 (West Supp. 2000).
1S6 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.700(5) (1999).
157 See, e.g., FLA. STAT.ANN. § 765.101(8) (West Supp. 2001); MO.ANN. STAT.
§ 404.805(2) (West Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-72(1) (1999).
"I See supra note 17. "[C]ompetency is not a medical decision and should not
merge with the commitment decision." In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla.
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Further, a civil commitment is no longer equivalent to a determination
of incompetence.159 This has shifted over the past few decades, as rights for
persons with mental illness have increased. Often, unfortunately, a shift in
the laws is not always mirrored by a shift in public opinion. Indeed, little
is required to establish incompetence in the eyes of many who still retain
nineteenth century notions that persons with mental illness are per se
incompetent.16° Contrary to public opinion, however, only when there has
been a discrete assessment of incompetence may the state legitimately
exercise its parens patriae power.
Many statutes provide that an advance directive cannot take effect until
it is placed in the principal's medical file or given to the appropriate health
care professional.161 In some states, however, an advance directive is
effective when written.
When does an advance directive cease to be effective? 62 Obviously,
when the principal regains competence. While the answer may be obvious,
its application is less so. For end-of-life advance directives, competence
may never be regained and such a question never reached. Mental health
1980).
159 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. &INST. CODE § 5331 (West 1998); State ex rel. Jones
v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987). Nor does a commitment decision
necessarily strip the committed person of the right to refuse medication. See, e.g.,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.5(d) (West 1998).
,6 Bruce 3. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and
TherapeuticImplications, 2 PSYCH.PUB. POL'Y&L. 137, 151 (1996) ("In the 19th
century, mental illness was regarded as an illness with certain characteristic effects.
Among them was that mental illness invariably destroyed decision-making
ability.").
161 See, e.g., OR.REV. STAT. § 127.710 (1999). This requirement may create an
additional barrier to the use of mental health advance directives. Someone in the
throes of a mental health crisis may well end up in any manner of places, and end
up there without a copy of her advance directive handy. See Patricia Backlar,
Anticipatory PlanningforPsychiatric Treatment Is Not Quite the Same as Planning
for End-of-Life Care, 33 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 261, 266 (1997).
Accordingly, Backlar suggests that a central registry may be called for, provided
it is enacted with provisions that protect confidentiality. Id. Another alternative is
to have an emergency card that a person can carry in a wallet. Deborah S. Pinkney,
Advance Directive Could Give Mentally Ill More Treatment Control, AM. MED.
NEWS, Dec. 16, 1991, at 3, 22. These cards, already in use in Hawaii, could list the
existence and site of a person's mental health advance directive. See id.
62 A principal can revoke or rescind an advance directive, but such revocation
would usually occur while competent Some states also provide for time limits on
advance directives. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-502(6)(a) (2000).
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advance directives, on the other hand, address cyclical illnesses and the
issue of regaining competence is likely to arise.
D. Mental Health Advance Directives
1. Early Development
Advance directives for physical health decisions have arrived as a legal
concept. 163 Mental health advance directives, although not yet fully
embraced, have been under consideration for decades.", As with physical
health advance directives, mental health advance directives come under
various names, including living wills,'6 Ulysses contracts,16 psychiatric
wills, 67 and voluntary commitment contracts.1 6 The terminology "advance
directive" gained currency in the 1990s.
The Ulysses contract is avery particular kind of mental health advance
directive by which persons consent to treatment during periods of future
incompetence. 169 The key to the Ulysses contract, and the reason for its
163 Whether or not they are followed is another issue. See, for example, Backlar,
supra note 161, at 262, for a list of studies that have found that advance directives
are disregarded. See generally Gary N. Sales, The Health Care Proxy for Mental
Illness: Can It Work and Should We Want It To?, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 161, 163-65 (1993) (discussing patient and doctor attitudes
towards and experiences with advance directives).
' Mental health advance directives have been debated for some years now. In
1991, Paul Appelbaum suggested that mental health advance directives were "on
the verge of having a major impact on psychiatric care." Appelbaum, supra note
149, at 983. Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock referred to mental health advance
directives in 1989, as "an important... but.., largely untapped... opportunity."
BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 120, at 350.
16s BRUCE J. ENNIS & RICHARD D. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS
43 (1978).
166 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1979).
117 Szasz, supra note 6, at 762.
'" Dresser, supra note 6, at 777-78. This article is an early offering in the field.
Dresser, however, critiques voluntary commitment contracts, rather than praises
them. She finds their paternalism, albeit self-paternalism, fraught with problems.
See id. at 785.
" See Audrey Macklin, Bound to Freedom: The Ulysses Contract and the
Psychiatric Will, 45 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 37 (1987), for a discussion of the
difference between refusing and consenting to treatment in an advance direc-
tive.
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name,17° is its irrevocability. No matter how much subsequently incompe-
tent consumers1 7 ' plead to change what is in the contract, such pleas are not
to be heeded.12 The belief is that while competent, persons can clearly
select that which is best, a choice that they might rescindwhen incompetent
and in the throes of a mental illness."7
The notion of irrevocability during periods of incompetence is nothing
new; indeed, it is standard legal doctrine to require competence before any
legally binding decision is made. Different here, however, is that some
commentators have suggested that a Ulysses contract should be irrevocable
even during periods of future competence. 4 On the other hand, some
durable power of attorney statutes provide for revocation regardless of a
principal's mental state.175 This idea, that a patient's subsequent decision
should always supersede a prior advance directive, especially if it chooses
treatment formerly refused, finds support in numerous quarters.176
"0 The name refers to Ulysses's instruction to his crew to tie him to the ship's
mast and leave him bound as the ship approached the Sirens, regardless of his
subsequent entreaties to cut him loose. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 258-59 (William
Cullen Bryant trans., 1899).
1' It is now commonplace within the field to refer to users of mental health
services as consumers, not patients or clients, although those terms may still be
appropriate in certain circumstances.
" Unlike a traditional advance directive, which is unilateral, aUlysses contract
is a contract between patient and doctor. Macklin, supra note 169, at 38. There are
now different variations on the theme of Ulysses contracts. The terms most likely
to change are those regarding whether the irrevocability applies to periods of
competence as well as incompetence and whether one can reject as well as consent
to treatment via the contract. The term has also been altered to include Ulysses
directives, defined to mean a Ulysses contract authorized by statute. See Roberto
Cuca, Note, Ulysses in Minnesota: First Steps Toward a Self-Binding Psychiatric
Advance Directive Statute, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1152, 1154 (1993).
"73 See Jennifer Radden, Planning for Mental Disorder: Buchanan and Brock
on Advance Directives in Psychiatry, 18 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 165, 169-72
(1992); Rhoden, supra note 113, at 853.
74 See Winick, supra note 6, at 86-94. Certainly, however, some commentators
support revocability of Ulysses contracts by competentpersons. See Raddensupra
note 173, at 179; Cuca, supra note 172, at 1174.
" See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3285(A) (West Supp. 2000); UNIF.
HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 3(b), 9 (I.B) U.L.A. 155 (1999) ("An individual
may revoke.., an advance health-care directive... at any time and in any manner
that communicates an intent to revoke."); Stavis, supra note 138, at 43 & n. 137.
'76 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3285 (A) (West Supp. 2000); Dresser, supra
note 6, at 782-83; Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for Psychiatric
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Two different principles are at work here under the concept of
autonomy. Those principles are seen inthejuxtaposition of choosing future
treatment and in rejecting it. When individuals choose to bind themselves,
like Ulysses, to treatment in the future when they fear their resolve will be
weak, they ostensibly choose betterjudgment over moral weakness.177 They
know what is right as it is seen clearly in the present, but fear the inability
to claim that right path at some future point. Although some have asserted
that this is paternalistic, it is nonetheless justifiable on autonomy princi-
ples.
On the other hand, when the right to refuse treatment is asserted in an
advance directive, also under the rubric of self-determination, some would
argue that such a position is morally irresponsible. That argument suggests
that the counterpoint of autonomy is responsibility and that refusing
treatment-and thereby arguably prolonging illness-is irresponsible. It is
clear that the right to refuse is a qualified right that may be overridden
when, for instance, dependent third parties are involved. 178 Some would
take the responsibility principle further and assert an obligation to make
"healthful decisions." 7 ' To apply this theory, however, to those with
mental illness would be discriminatory and would invite charges of
sanism,8 ° for one simple reason: "healthful decision[-making]" is not
required of persons who are not mentally ill.
Dr. Thomas Szasz suggests the use of a psychiatric will to achieve the
goal of complete protection from coerced psychiatry without depriving
persons who wish to be the beneficiaries of involuntary psychiatric
interventions from the protections that such measures "allegedly" offer. 18
Szasz suggests that, with a psychiatric will, persons could avoid involun-
tary psychiatric care should they become acutely ill and unable to
competently reject treatment." z He proposes an inverted psychiatric will,
Care: A Theoretical and Practical Overviewfor Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 746, 778-82 (1998).
" See Radden, supra note 173, at 175.
17 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985); cf. Randy Cohen, Worsefor
Not Wearing, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 18.
'9 Stavis, supra note 138, at 47.
'
80 See infra note 361 and accompanying text.
181 See Szasz, supra note 6, at 763. In view of Szasz's position that mental
illness does not exist, this proposal provides for autonomy unconditionally in that
it allows a person to opt for treatment for what is, in Szasz's eyes, a non-existent
illness. See id. at 767-68. Its medical soundness is another matter.
Is2 See id. at 766. The will analogy has been used by others. Professor Winick
has even suggested that, in cases where an advance directive cannot be followed
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in which persons who wanted treatment would execute such a will; the
absence of a psychiatric will would signify a lack of consent.1 13 He
concedes, however, that current social practice makes such an arrangement
impracticable. I" He therefore suggests a document in which persons would
forbid their confinement to a mental hospital."85
The voluntary commitment contract springs into effect not upon the
consumer's incompetence, but rather, upon the consumer's deterioration to
the point where medication andtreatmentwould be beneficial. 8 6 One could
argue that this concept short-circuits self-determination by removing
decision-making power before incompetence occurs. If it is indeed a
voluntary choice, however, a voluntary commitment contract gives voice
to autonomy of a different kind. There is undoubtedly a netherworld of
quasi-competence. If persons know that they inhabit that world, they may
well chooseto cede certainrights of self-determination for otherbenefits.
8 7
Therefore, a voluntary commitment contract honors a person's right to
bring into effect choices sooner than the law would permit absent explicit
instructions.
2. Current Development
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the validity of advance
directives for mental illness. All of its various pronouncements related to
the concept suggest only that the Court would embrace the validity of
mental health advance directives if the issue were to come before it.' 8 The
precisely as the principal intended, it should be reinterpreted in a way consistent
with the principal's will, thus creating an advance directive version of the cy pres
doctrine, which permits terms of a will to be recast to permit compliance with a
testator's intent. See Winick, supra note 6, at 90-91.
183 See Szasz, supra note 6, at 768.
' See id. at 768-69.
' See id. at 768. It is unlikely that such a proscription would be honored under
certain circumstances. A person's danger to others (and perhaps self) might be
sufficient to invoke the state's police or parens patriae power to override a decree
not to be involuntarily committed. However, if a person forbade the use of
psychiatric medications-as opposedto hospitalization-a stronger argument could
be made for adhering to the will, as there might be alternate ways such as
confinement to satisfy the state's interest in protecting others.
'86 See Dresser, supra note 6, at 777-83.
T87'This concept has been criticized as being a form of self-paternalism. See id.
at 784-87.
18 See Winick, supra note 6, at 64. Professor Winick asserts that the due
process liberty interest recognized in Cruzan applies to all "persons," including the
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Court has repeatedly upheld the doctrines of autonomy and self-determina-
tion. It has extended the right to refuse treatment to the incompetent"8 9 and
to issues involving psychiatric medication.190 Indeed, the extension of
advance directives to mental health may be easier than the initial adoption
of directives for physical health care, as several of the key state interests
against which a refusal of life-sustaining treatment must be weighed are
absent in mental health cases. For example, the state's interest in saving a
particular individual's life and in preserving the sanctity of life are not
typically issues in psychiatric care.' 9'
There are differences between advance directives formental health care
and physical health care. There are, however, many similarities; they are,
at the core, the same document. 9' Any kind of advance directive addresses
future situations and attempts to anticipate the decisions that those
situations will require. With a mental health advance directive, individuals
think about prospective choices regarding theirmental health care. They set
forth instructions regarding mental health care that are to take effect during
future periods of incompetence.'1 As with a physical health care advance
directive, a mental health advance directive may be either an instructional
directive, a proxy directive," or a combination of the two. As with a
mentally ill, pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 67. The right
of the mentally ill to refuse treatment was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Riggins v. Nevada and Washington v. Harper. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127
(1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). In those cases, however, the
Court was not required to examine the advance planning concept as it related to
mental health issues.
"9 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
190 See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127; Harper, 494 U.S. at 210.
9I Of course, arefusal of treatment could potentially cause arapid deterioration
into a psychotic state or place a person at heightened risk for causing injury to
others. In those circumstances, other state interests might come in to play. For a
discussion of when a state's police or parens patriae powers might override an
advance directive for psychiatric care, see infra Part l!I.D.3.
'" Contra Patricia Backlar, Anticipatory Planning for Research Participants
with Psychotic Disorders Like Schizophrenia, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 829,
839-40 (1998); Radden, supra note 173, at 171-72.
193 Although advance directives, whether for physical or psychiatric care, take
effect upon incompetence, a voluntary commitment contract may be available to
take effect during that period where incompetence cannot be established but the
person may be suffering the ill effects of mental illness nonetheless. See Dresser,
supra note 6, at 777-83.
194 Patricia Backlar has pointed out that for some individuals with severe and
persistent mental illness, relationships with close friends and family, those whom
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physical health care advance directive, a mental health advance directive
could either reject treatment or consent to it. 95 For each type of directive,
the individual must be competent when executing the directive and must
comply with any statutory requirements. 19 Advance directive statutes are
legislative embodiments of constitutional and common law rights. Thus,
even if an advance directive did not meet particular statutory provisions, it
would nonetheless prove useful as a clear statement of a person's wishes
which, under constitutional and common law principles, should be honored.
Despite the similarities, there are numerous distinctions between
advance directives for physical health care and mental health advance
directives. The first is the nature of the decision made. As one author has
stated: "one directive attempts to guarantee... a good death; while the
other endeavors to secure... a good life. ' 197 In a typical advance directive
for physical health care, one is projecting choices for future circumstances
involving terminal medical decisions.' These circumstances, although
potentially prolonged and doubtless trying, happen only once. Psychiatric
disorders, on the other hand, are typically cyclical and, accordingly,
address behavior that is familiar and predictable.'99 Consequently, persons
executing advance directives for end-of-life decisions can only speculate
about what they would want, whereas those with mental illness executing
one might naturally seek as a proxy, are often fractured beyond repair, or at feast
beyond the point where a proxy selection would be appropriate. Backlar, supra
note 161, at 264. On the other hand, mental health providers, who in some
circumstances form close relationships with mental health consumers, cannot be
chosen as a proxy because of the obvious conflict of interest. Id. It has also been
suggested that a mental health consumer's distrust of others makes proxy directives
more difficult in the psychiatric arena. See Brown, supra note 154, at 10.
11 In the mental health area, consenting to treatment is potentially more legally
troublesome than is refusal of treatment, as there is not yet a constitutionally
established right to treatment. This legal wrinkle may run contrary to popular
opinion, which may likely be more troubled by an advance directive that refuses
antipsychotic drugs than one that consents to them. The right to treatment, although
not constitutionalized, has been recognized by numerous courts. See Leonard S.
Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health Treatment in Publicly
Financed Health Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 315, 320-23 (1996).
11 These statutory requirements could include, for example, executing an
advance directive in the presence of witnesses. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-
2205(c) (Supp. 2000).
97 Backlar, supra note 161, at 262.
198 Id.
'" Backlar, supra note 192, at 840.
[VOL. 89
MENTAL HEALTH ADVANCE DmEcTrvEs
mental health advance directives may well have already experienced the
condition about which they are seeking to make future decisions. °0 In such
circumstances, mental health advance directives make even more sense.
Second, mental health advance directives may have different and
potentially greater long-term consequences for both the individual and
society. For instance, an advance directive articulating the right to refuse
treatment will, in physical health care cases, most likely accelerate death.201
By contrast, refusal oftreatment via a mental health advance directiveimay
not hasten death in any measurable sense, but may well have other
quantifiably negative consequences. For example, when persons with
mental illness deteriorate into psychosis, they, upon emerging from the
psychotic state, likely are less well than before: their baseline functioning
level is diminished as a result of having been psychotic.2 2 This reduced
capacity most likely translates into a need for greater assistance, which has
both economic and human costs.2' Thus, there are real, negative conse-
quences, from an objective standpoint, in permitting persons to refuse
psychiatric treatment.
Persons who refuse antipsychotic treatment will have untreated
symptoms of a disease that could lead them to pose an increased risk of
harm to self or others. Active risk of harm to self or others will, in nearly
all cases, override an advance directive decision that refuses treatment.2 4
200 An extant psychiatric diagnosis-and perhaps even a prior psychotic
episode-may be a sine quanon for executing apsychiatric advance directive. See,
e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327F-I to -3 (1993); Backlar, supra note 192, at 840.
This seems to be a wise requirement. To the extent that advance directives come
under attack as violating informed consent, a person who has experienced the
conditions about which she is now seeking to articulate future binding choices is
certainly more likely to be making an informed choice than is a person who is
merely speculating about treatment for an illness that she does not yet have.
201 It is true, of course, that refusing or ceasing treatment will not inexorably
cause death. Karen Ann Quinlan, the subject of In re Quinlan, for example,
survived (albeit in a coma) until June 11, 1985, more than nine years after she was
removed from life support onMay 22,1976. Catherine J. Jones, TeachingBioethics
in the Law School Classroom: Recent History, Rapid Advances, the Challenges of
the Future, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 417,417 nn.3-4 (1994).
o See, e.g., Sally R. Szymanski et al., Course of Treatment Response in First-
Episode and Chronic Schizophrenia, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 519 (1996).
2 3 Economic costs as a significant state interest have a mixed history. See, e.g.,
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). However, persons are permitted to make
health and recreation decisions every day that lead to astronomical economic costs.
204 For a discussion of when an advance directive may permissibly be
overridden, see infra Part III.D.3.
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Notwithstanding the objectivelynegative consequences, permittingthe
right to refuse treatment in the face of such possibilities demonstrates an
appropriately high regard for autonomythat is consistent with longstanding
legal principles. For physical care advance directives, persons are allowed
to refuse treatment even though the inevitable consequence is death.
Therefore, persons with mental illness should be permitted to make
treatment choices, including refusal of treatment, when the results are less
severe.
The decision to refuse treatment is typically scrutinized more carefully
than is the choice to assent to treatment recommended by a health care
professional.205 Patients who accede to a doctor's recommendation-who,
in essence, give informed consent, are unlikely to be challenged. On the
other hand, patients who reject a doctor's prescribed wisdom are much
more likely to subject their competence to questioning.2°6
Legally, however, an advance directive refusing treatment is more
likely to enjoy constitutional protection than is an advance directive
consenting to treatment.20 7 There is a clear right to refuse health care
treatment for both physical and psychiatric illnesses.208 The right to receive
treatment, however, is far less clear.2°9 This is true especially if the
treatment is one that is experimental, controversial, or contrary to the
treating professional's clinical judgment.210 Moreover, if an advance
directive authorizes hospitalization, then there may be constitutional
concerns implicating both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 '
21 See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction
Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REv. 15, 27-46 (1991).
2o See Susan Stefan, Race, Competence Testing, andDisabilityLaw: A Review
of the MacArthur Competence Research, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 31, 35
(1996).
'oSeeWinick,supra note 6, at 70-71. ProfessorWinick, however, suggests that
in cases where a person of questionable competence is seeking to revoke a prior
advance directive and where that revocation would result in rejection of treatment
or hospitalization recommendedby atherapist, that decision should be more strictly
scrutinized. See id. at 91-94.
20 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).209 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,316-20 (1982).
210 Several advance directive statutes permit doctors to refuse to follow an
advance directive that contravenes medical judgment or, occasionally, religious or
moral beliefs. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 14 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
211 See Dresser, supra note 6, at 792-808 (arguing that forced hospitalization
through a voluntary commitment contract is akin to slavery).
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3. Enforceability
a. Overview
Conceptually, mental health advance directives are legally unassail-
able; however, their enforceability may be more difficult to achieve.
Although the Cruzan case assumed the existence of a right to refuse
treatment," 2 it also upheld the state's right to require proof of a person's
desire to refuse treatment by the heavy burden of clear and convincing
evidence."3 Thus, a state may regulate mental health advance directives,
even if it may not prohibit them.21 4
What factors would enhance enforceability? First, the person signing
an advance directive must be competent at the time of the document's
execution. Second, advance directives that refuse treatment have a better
claim to constitutional protection than do those consenting to treatment.2 5
Advance directives that specifically address the extant medical condition
are less likely to raise concerns of lack of informed consent or clinical
inappropriateness inviolation of medical ethics. Further, statutory schemes
that provide immunity for the good faith adherence to an advance
directive 6 are more likely, as a practical matter, to procure physicians'
cooperation.
Even assuming competence, specificity, immunity, and rejection of
rather than request for treatment, mental health advance directives are not
beyond attack. Although some state interests regarding physical health care
advance directives are not as strong when considered in the context of
mental health advance directives, 7 other state interests and powers are
stronger. These interests and powers, discussed below, interfere with the
unfettered use of mental health advance directives.
212 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
2131 d. at 284.
214 The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the issue of mental
health advance directives. It has, however, found constitutional protections in the
right of incompetents to refuse treatment and, in the prison context, the right to
refuse psychiatric medications. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992);
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). It is hard to
fathom how the Court could, consistent with these rulings, find against the right to
execute mental health advance directives.
21 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
216 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 327F-13 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 11-
112 (West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.555 (1999).
217 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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b. The State's Parens Patriae and Police Powers
There are several state interests that are routinely balanced against an
individual's right to refuse life-saving medical treatment. Those interests
include preserving an individual's life, preserving the sanctity of life
generally, preventing suicide, and maintaining the integrity of medical
ethics.218 Typically, however, those interests will yield to a clearly
articulated decision to refuse such treatment.
219
The refusal of psychiatric medical treatment, on the other hand, has
different state interests that must be weighed when determining whether an
individual's right to refuse treatment can be honored. The U.S. Supreme
Court cases most directly on point have occurred within the criminal justice
setting and implicated issues of control and safety within prisons and
jails.2' Outside the penal context, there are other state interests that are
balanced against the right to refuse. The state's parens patriae and police
powers each provide an independent state interest that might, under certain
circumstances, validly override a mental health advance directive.22
i. Parens Patriae
The state's parens patriae power vests in the state the authority to help
those deemed incapable of helping themselves.' Persons with mental
illness have historically been among the prime objects of this power.2
Parens patriae is one of the powers by which states can involuntarily
commit the mentally ill and, in some cases, treat them against their will.22
If, however, a person with a psychiatric disorder prepares an advance
directive while competent, there is no valid basis for exercising the state's
parens patriae power because the person has made the choice while
218 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
219 See id. at 273.
2
1
0 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990).
221 See Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous
Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IsSUES 61, 74-85 (1999) (discussing the risks
and problems of conflating parens patriae and police powers).
I Under English common law, parens patriae was the power of the crown to
care for the infirm and incompetent See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).
2 See id. Children are the other typical beneficiaries. See id.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583-84 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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competent.? Indeed, the parens patriae power has been characterized as a
"default rule" applicable only in the absence of a valid advance directive.2 6
Even if competent persons choose, either presently or prospectively,
actions that will cause them harm, that choice is theirs and should not be
overridden under the guise of parens patriae. This easy and clear view of
parens patriae, as applying only after a determination of an individual's
incompetence n 7 is honored in the breach. The literature is replete with two
concepts: first, that the right to refuse treatment is a fundamental right that
adheres even in the face of death m and second, that parens patriae is a
beneficent state power1 9 to help persons incapable of helping themselves
and thus is applicable only when a person lacks capacity. 0 Nonetheless,
parens patriae authority is often invoked to prevent harm to persons who,
while competent, have chosen a course that will probably-or perhaps
inexorably-result in harm? 1 This dichotomy is one example of how
mental health care decisions are treated differently. Persons with physical
illnesses are allowed to make choices that will end in death but persons
with mental illness often are not allowedto make decisions with results less
severe.
ii. Police Power
In certain circumstances police power may also appropriately override
a valid advance directive. While persons may have the right to decline life-
'At least one state with specific statutory authority for mental health advance
directives creates an exception that allows for divergence from a patient's wishes.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.720 (1999).
Winick, supra note 6, at 70.
"We are persuaded that parens patriae is not broad enough to control medical
decisions of a competent person." In re K.I.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1980).
1 See, e.g., Zant v. Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982) (holding that a
prisoner has a right to starve himself to death). The prisoner was rational with no
evidence of abnormal behavior "except to the extent it is not normal to starve
oneself." Id. at 716. But see State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va.
1982) (holding that a prisoner does not have right to starve himself).
19 Some say that this is the time to be most wary of state power. See, e.g.,
David 3. Rothman, Introduction to WILLARD GAYLIN ET AL., DOING GOOD: THE
LIMrrS OF BENEVOLENCE at ix, x (1978).
23 S ee Winick, supra note 6, at 64-65.
2' See, e.g., In re Gertrude K., 675 N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). In
addition, risk of harm to self is a ground for civil commitment, which is a classic
exercise of parens patriae power.
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sustaining treatment, or treatment that will result in psychiatric stabiliza-
tion, they do not hve the right to refuse treatment if that refusal will lead
them to be a danger to others. The police power is appropriately exercised,
therefore, if there is a risk to the community.32
While it is hard to quibble with the exercise of police powers to avoid
harm to others, the state should not use its police powers to intervene to
prevent harm to self-3 3 Although recent changes to civil commitment laws
have made involuntary commitment easier by permitting commitment for
reasons short of risk of harm to self,z 4 this more lenient standard should
not be grounds to override an advance directive declining treatment. Just
as choices regarding traditional medical treatment are subjective and not
to be judged by an objective standard,2" so should decisions regarding
mental health treatment, provided they are made when a person is
competent. Bad decisions or decisions unsupportedbyprofessionals, which
12 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979).
233 In Rivers v. Katz the court sanctioned this use of the police powers, in a case
otherwise very sensitive to the rights of the mentally ill. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d
337, 343 (N.Y. 1986). "Where the patient presents a danger to himself... the State
may be warranted, in the exercise of its police power, in administering
antipsychotic medication over the patient's objections." Id.
234 See Darold A. Treffert, The MacArthur Coercion Studies: A Wisconsin
Perpective, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 759, 780-83 (1999) (discussing Wisconsin's "Fifth
standard," which permits commitment upon a showing of a need for treatment,
among other things); see also N.Y. MENTALHYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (McKinney Supp.
2001). New York's new "assisted outpatient treatment" law, known as Kendra's
Law, can force court-ordered treatment upon someone in the community if that
person, among other things, has a mental illness, is unlikely to survive safely in the
community without supervision (based upon a clinical, not legal judgment), and is
unlikely to voluntarily participate in treatment Id. Governor George Pataki signed
the law on August 9, 1999, with the right to file petitions taking effect ninety days
later. Martin G. Karopkin, An Overview ofKendra 's Law; The New Mental Health
Law, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 7, 1999, at 1. This law appears to eviscerate the notion of the
right to refuse, by allowing forced treatment on grounds short of that necessary for
involuntary commitment. SeeN.Y. MENTALHYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney Supp.
2001). Kendra's Law acknowledges the health care proxy law and requires that any
instruction contained in thatproxy be considered in fashioning a treatmentplan, but
makes it clear that a person who has appointed a proxy may still be subject to
outpatient treatment. Id. § 9.60(c)(8)-(d).
I5 See In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607,
613 (N.Y. 1988).
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are likely to be the decisions that are labeled bad, 36 have legal authority as
long as the person making them is competent. It should not matter whether
the decisions involve physical or psychiatric care.
More troubling is the right to refuse treatment if that refusal may lead
to suicide. Closer inquiry, however, shows that a potential suicide may not
be sufficient to invoke police powers. Although there is no fundamental
right to assisted suicide, 37 a person refusing medication may not be intent
upon dying, but rather may "fervently wish to live, but to do so free of
unwanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs."238 If suicide is not the
intent but rather the byproduct of the cessation of medication, it is ofakind
with those deaths resulting from the cessation of breathing tubes or other
life-saving treatment. Thus, it would be consistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court's "distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient
die.'!231
Even assuming, however, that suicide is intended, and fiuther that the
state may legitimately act to prevent this, it is possible that confinement is
a better choice than forced administration of medication. 2 If the right to
refuse treatment is in fact a fundamental right, the state can abridge it in
very limited circumstances. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
involuntary psychiatric treatment is more invasive of liberty interests than
is routine confinement.241 Accordingly, confinement without invasive
medical treatment would be a more constitutionally acceptable exercise of
state police power in preventing suicide.242
236 A person's mere profession of disagreement with a proposed treatment plan
is likely the action that leads a doctor to seek court authority to provide non-
consensual treatment based upon a person's asserted incompetence. See Stefan,
supra note 206, at 35.
237 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-28 (1997).
23 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985).
2 9Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997).
2One could argue that in the case of involuntary hospitalization, confinement
and treatment are the same thing. The possibility of suicide is an excellent example
of the utility of an advance directive. If persons know that, as a result of mental
illness, they are likely to become suicidal, they could dictate in an advance
directive the preferred course of action-confinement or drug treatment.
24! See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,492-94 (1980).
24 Professor Richard Bonnie also argues in favor of confinement or seclusion
over forced medication, albeit in the slightly different circumstance of dealing with
"emergencies" involving involuntarily committed yet competent patients. Bonnie,
supra note 26, at 24. He reasons that confinement and seclusion are easier to
monitor and less invasive. Id.
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Confinement without treatment is subject to legitimate criticism.243
First, it harkens back to days when institutional abuses of warehousing
patients gave rise to extensive class action suits.2" Further, mental health
personnel would argue that their mission is to treat rather than to confine
and that the latter without the former violates the Hippocratic Oath.
Although this is a legitimate medical ethical concern, patient autonomy
generally prevails over medical ethics.24 The solution cannot be to uphold
the Hippocratic Oath at the expense of fundamental constitutional rights.
The solution may be to create an intermediate placement where the goal is
safety, not treatment.2"
c. Overriding Advance Directives
There are anecdotal and documented stories of medical professionals
failing to adhere to advance directives.247 This may be an example of
doctors inadvertently acting in a way to invite lawsuits, rather than out of
a fear ofthem. Following an advance directive, particularly in a state where
there is immunity for good faith adherence to directives, is not likely to
result in litigation-at least not successful litigation. On the other hand, a
doctor's failure to follow a clear and validly executed advance directive
flies in the face of patient rights and could expose the doctor to liability.
24"
2 3 See Eugene J. Comey, Patients' Rights: Too Much Courting, Not Enough
Caring, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS: VALUES IN
CONFLICT 49,49-50 (A. Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey eds., 1982).
m See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
245 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see also In
re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
246 It is undeniable that this solution suggests horrific images. So too, however,
does the notion of patients exercising a right to refuse a particular treatment that
can lead to death. If we refuse to force treatment that sustains life, how can we
force treatment that sustains sanity? Moreover, forced medication that is used
primarily, or exclusively, as a restraint is a far cry from "treatment" and is
universally condemned. See Litman, supra note 25, at 1738-40 (explaining that the
forcible use of medication as a restraint is violative of professional standards, is
unconstitutional in a prison setting, and unlawful based on a common law battery
analysis).24 See Backlar, supra note 161, at 262.
2
" In Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio
1996), the Ohio Supreme Court stated that:
unwanted life-saving treatment does not go undeterred. Where a patient
clearly delimits the medical measures he or she is willing to undergo, and
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Assuming that advance directives are sometimes ignored, the question
remains whether there are occasions on which they may he properly
ignored-for example, when they are superseded by other, weightier
values. The question can be broken down even further: are there times
when persons may overrule their own advance directive or when medical
personnel may refuse to honor it?249 Thus, central to determining whether
an advance directive may be overidden is the competence of the person
executing it10 The proffered reason for the refusal of medication or, more
generally, treatment, could very well influence whether the person is
considered competent and thus whether the refusal is deemed valid.
Competence is a common legal requirement. It is a necessary predicate
for the valid execution of many legal transactions from wills to contracts
to marriage. It is also an aspect of "informed consent" for treatment or the
refusal thereof, and it is a requirement to stand trial for a criminal offense.
In the past decade, there have been studies assessing the competence and
decision-making capacity of persons hospitalized with mental illness. 5
One study reports that persons hospitalized with mental illness have
impaired decision-making capacity when compared to those hospitalized
for physical illnesses and those not hospitalized? -2 When all four measures
gauging competencem were analyzed, those diagnosed with schizophrenia
a health care provider disregards such instructions, the consequences for
that breach would include the damages arising from any battery inflicted on
the patient, as well as appropriate licensing sanctions against the medical
professionals.
Id. at 229. Such language notwithstanding, the court did not find the hospital liable.
Id.
24 A competent person may generally change or rescind an advance directive
at any time. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 11-109 (West Supp. 2000).
There has been discussion in some quarters of a wholly irrevocable advance
directive structured such that even a competentperson could not later revoke it. See
Winick, supra note 6, at 86-87; supra notes 169-80 and accompanying text.
'1o See generally Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Form-
ulating Standards ofLegal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS
L. REV. 345 (1996) (examining competence standards in general).
251 See, e.g., MACARTHURRESEARCHNETwORK ONMENTALHEALTH AND THE
LAW, THE MACARTHUR TREATMENT COMPETENCE STUDYEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(1999), http'/ness.sys.virginia.edu/macarthur/treatment.html.
21 See id.
I Those measures are the abilities to: state a choice, understand relevant infor-
mation, appreciate the nature of one's own illness, and reason with information.
Id.
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were impaired on at least one of four measures fifty percent of the time,
and those who carry a diagnosis of depression scored as impaired twenty-
five percent of the time3P As the study authors point out, these four factors
do not necessarily correspond to any particular jurisdiction's test for
competence.35 So, of the fifty percent of persons with schizophrenia who
were found impaired if all four measures were examined, fully one-half of
those performed adequately when only one measure was examined. 6 In
another study of the use of computer-based advance directives by persons
with mental illness, only ten percent failed the screening portion designed
to eliminate those who lacked capacity.257
There are numerous tests for competence.28 The minimalist approach
finds competence if a patient is able to communicate assent or objec-
254 See id.
2s See id.
21 See Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Com-
petence Study. H1: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical
Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 171 (1995).
17 See Paul Sherman, Computer-Assisted Creation of Psychiatric Advance
Directives, 34 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 351 (1998).
211 See, for example, Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986), in which the
Court of Appeals of New York cited with approval an eight-part test for assessing
competence. Those factors include:
(1) the person's knowledge that he has a choice to make; (2) the patient's
ability to understand the available options, their advantages and
disadvantages; (3) the patient's cognitive capacity to consider the relevant
factors; (4) the absence of any interfering pathologic perception or belief,
such as a delusion concerning the decision; (5) the absence of any
interfering emotional state, such as severe manic depression, euphoria or
emotional disability; (6) the absence of any interfering pathologic
motivational pressure; (7) the absence of any interfering pathologic
relationship, such as the conviction of helpless dependency on another
person; (8) an awareness of how others view the decision, the general social
attitude toward the choices and an understanding of his reason for deviating
from that attitude if he does.
Id at 344 n.7. The court in In re Israel, 664 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996), used
different factors. That court considered the following:
(1) The person's knowledge that he has a choice to make; (2) The person's
ability to understand the available options, their advantages and
disadvantages; (3) Whether the commitment is voluntary orinvoluntary; (4)
Whether the person has previously received the type of medication or
treatment at issue; (5) Ifthe person has received similar treatment in the
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tion.5 9 At the other end ofthe spectrum there is a multi-step process which
culminates with a requirement that the decision-making process be
logical. ° Further, it matters to some whether the decision being assessed
for competency is a decision to assent to treatment or a decision to
object.
261
Most tests, however, have three main elements. The following com-
ponents of competence are fairly representative. To be competent, a person
must have the ability to: 1) communicate a choice; 2) understand relevant
information; and 3) appreciate the situation and its likely consequences.262
Properly applied then, competence is about the decision-making process,
not the result. The challenge for lawyers, judges, family members, and
doctors is to refrain from declaring persons incompetent simply because
they have reached a different, and perhaps a bad, decision.263 As courts
have noted in cases of traditional medical decision-making, the choice is
past, whether he can describe what happened as a result and how the
effects were beneficial or harmful; and (6) The absence of any interfering
pathologic perceptions or beliefs or interfering emotional states which
might prevent an understanding of legitimate risks and benefits.
Id. at 1040.
11 Berg et al., supra note 250, at 352-53. "Inability to communicate a decision
means that the patient is unable effectively to make known his or her wishes
regarding treatment. Many courts use this element for a threshold determination of
competence." Id.
260 See id. at 357-58.
11 See Winick, supra note 6, at 70-72 (positing that advance directives pro-
viding for certain treatments may be afforded less constitutional protection than
advance directives rejecting treatments).
22 Berg et al., supra note 250, at 351. These components are fairly common;
an additional one, the ability to manipulate information rationally, is less so. Id. at
357. Although competence is a legal determination and capacity a medical one, the
two standards are remarkably similar. Capacity is assessed by evaluating:
1) the patient's understanding of the reason for the proposed treatment and
how to apply it to the patient's circumstances; 2) the patient's ability to
understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed treatment; 3)
the patient's ability to rationally weigh these considerations; 4) the patient's
ability to communicate his/her decisions and the basis for the decisions; and
5) whether the decision is voluntary.
Sales, supra note 163, at 170.
1 See In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d 894,898-900 (Wis. 1994) (holding that the
focus in such cases should be on whether the patient understands the implications
of his decision, not on whether the decision is good or bad).
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subjective and should not be assessed in an objective fashion using societal
standards.
2
If individuals are aware of their illness, know that there are drugs that
will help combat the illness, but decide that they do not want the drugs,
must they explain why? Under some formulas for testing competence, the
answer is yes.265 But should it be so? As one treatise on torts explains
regarding the law of informed consent, "idividual freedom . . . is
guaranteed only ifpeople are given the right to make choices which would
generally be regarded as foolish ones."266 Richard Cole, one of the lawyers
for the plaintiffs in Rogers v. Okin,267 suggests that psychiatrists seek what
other doctors do not have-the right to make decisions for patients.268 If he
is correct, and there is evidence that he is,269 there is no justification for
differential treatment.
One rational explanation for refusing treatment is the harmful, often
irreversible, and occasionally fatal side effects ofantipsychotic medication.
Commentators and courts alike have detailed the often horrific effects of
drug therapy and other forms of mental health treatment.27 Further, side
' In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419,423 (N.J. 1987) ("Medical choices ... are not to
be decided by societal standards of reasonableness or normalcy. Rather, it is the
patient's preferences-formed by his or her unique personal experiences--that
should control.").
65 See Berg et al., supra note 250, at 357-58; of Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H.
Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and Research: MacArthur and
Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssUEs 103, 119 (1999) (proposing a "patently
false delusional belief' standard for competency as a compromise between an
"impossible belief' standard and a "believe what your doctor believes" standard).
I"HARPER& JAMES,supra note 3, at 61. We are inconsistent as a society about
the types of foolish choices we will permit. For instance, states have begun passing
mandatory seatbelt laws but have also increased speed limits, which will result in
increased fatalities.
I See supra note 29 for the procedural history of Rogers v. Okin.
21 Richard Cole, Patients' Rights vs. Doctors' Rights: Which Should Take
Precedence?, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INsTITUToNs:
VALUES IN CONFLICT 56,68 (A. Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey eds., 1982).
9 The American Psychiatric Association in amicus briefs for the Rennie and
Rogers cases sought to have the course of treatment for all civilly committed
patients determined by the psychiatrist, with or without the patient's consent See
Comey, supra note 243, at 49-50.
270 Some of the most common side effects of psychotropic drugs are tardive
dyskinesia, akathesia, acute dystonia, and neuroleptic malignant syndrome. See
Riggins v.Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,134 (1992); Washingtonv. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
229-30 (1990); Brooks, supra note 27, at 947-5 1.
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effects have not disappeared with the recent spate of psychiatric medica-
tion. Death by virtue of a lower white blood cell count is a possibility with
Clozapine, a relatively new antipsychotic drug.27 Accordingly, patients
who receive it must also get weekly blood tests.2 Can a patient who rejects
Clozapinebecause ofa fear of needles be deemed competent, notwithstand-
ing the drug's potential2" to remediate psychosis? Or would such a fear be
denominated irrational andthus forced treatment sought? What if a patient
demurred based upon her aversion to death?274 Is that reason sound, or
should it be rejected because the risk is only slight?
What about lesser reasons? What if, for instance, the drug is merely
unpleasant? 27s Among the reasons cited in litigation for refusal to take
medication are dislike of the slow, drugged feeling, fear of permanent side
effects, and basic lethargy.276 Perhaps there are two drugs that produce the
same positive effects, though one makes the person feel lethargic and the
other does not.2 7 Patients with bipolar disorder may refuse medication
because they are very productive and creative in the hypomanic states that
precede full-blown and often psychotic mania.278 Or what if they just like
the euphoria, even without the corresponding productivity? Others may
decide that they dislike drugs' effects on their sexual functioning.
Who is to decide which of these reasons is reasonable? Should that
determination ever be required? For instance, in Toraty v. Mental Hygiene
Legal Services (In re Joseph "0 '),7 the court upheld Joseph O.'s compe-
271 PHYsICIANs' DESK REFERENCE 2008-09 (54th ed. 2000).
272 Id. at 2008.
273 The qualifier is necessary here because a full twenty percent of mentally ill
persons have virtually no response to antipsychotic medication. Brooks, supra note
27, at 946.
7 Even the ubiquitously mainstreamed Prozac has been alleged to cause
violence. Although the manufacturer, Eli Lilly, has successfully defeated lawsuits,
a suit was recently filed based upon the manufacturer's purchase of a patent that
warns against possible side effects of violence and suicide. See Mitchell Zuckoff,
Prozac Data Was Kept From Trial, Suit Says, BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 2000, at A1.
275 See, e.g., In re Miller, 705 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). Mr. Miller
opposed taking medication because, "I don't like needles." Id. at 147.
276 Cole, supra note 268, at 61.
277 Such examples are not fanciful. Different drugs used to treat the same
symptoms may well affect the consumer in radically different ways. See, e.g.,
Toraty v. Mental Hygiene Legal Seres. (In re Joseph "0"), 666 N.Y.S.2d 322,323
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
8 See generally KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND (1995).
279 Joseph "0", 666 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
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tence to refuse drugs when the trial testimony indicated that he knew his
medical history, including a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, and that
he was aware that his condition had been stabilized on medication for
twenty years.280 His current refusal of medication was based upon his belief
that his schizophrenia had been ameliorated by prolonged exposure to the
sun.281 The court found that Joseph 0. had capacity, citing his clearly
expressed desire to remain institutionalized ifthat was the cost of refusing
medication.8 2
There is much debate over whether persons with mental illness must
comprehend that they have a mental illness in order to be competent to
consent to or refuse treatment. The waters are even murkier: does
"comprehend" mean awareness that a diagnosis of mental illness has been
rendered or agreement with that diagnosis?2"3 In Virgil D. v. Rock County
(In re VirgilD.),28 4 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared that a person
need not accept that she has a mental illness, only that she understands the
risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed psychotropic medica-
tions."5 It thus reversed a lower court order permitting forced medication
based upon a psychiatrist's testimony that Virgil was incompetent to
consent or refuse "because he had no insight into his own mental illness."286
IV. STATE RESPONSES
A. Statutory Law
There are three ways a state may enact legislation that provides for
mental health advance directives.2 87 First, a state may amend its generic
28 0 l at 324. The refusal to take medication after twenty years of successful
treatment arose after Joseph O.'s doctor changed Joseph O.'s medication, from
Stelazine to Risperdal, at the request of his brother. Id. at 323. The case does not
indicate that the doctor obtained informed consent from Joseph 0. before making
the change, nor does it reveal any side effects of the new drug that may have
caused Joseph 0. to begin to resist the administration of any medication. See id. at
323-24. This poignant example underscores both the helpfulness and uncertainty
of psychotropic medication.
281 Id. at 324.282 I d. The court did consider it a close call. Id.
283 See Robert D. Miller, AdvanceDirectivesforPsychiatric Treatment: A View
from the Trenches, 4 PSYCHOL.PUB. POL'Y &L. 728,739 (1998); Cuca, supra note
172, at 1169.
284 Virgil D. v. Rock County (In re Virgil D.), 524 N.W.2d 894 (Wisc. 1994).
285 Id. at 898. This was a statutory standard, enacted in response to ajudicially
acknowledged right to refuse. Id.
286 Id. at 896.
287 See generally Fleischer, supra note 150 (describing the different types of
advance directive statutes).
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advance directive, durable power of attorney for health care, or health care
proxy statutes to include mental health care decisions.1s Several states have
enacted discrete statutes that address mental health care decisions
exclusively.89 Some states have done both,290 although such a course may
invite confusion.2 1 Finally, in states where legislatures have not taken
explicit action regarding mental health care decisions, the standard advance
directive ought to suffice, provided that it does not specifically exclude
mental health decisions.2
The statutes have many similarities; many of the combination statutes
are patterned after the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act.293 The Uniform
Act's definition of health care provides that health care "means any care,
288 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 201D, § 6 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
289 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327F-1 to -16 (1993); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 43/1 - 43/115 (West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.700 - .737 (1999).
290 See HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27, 327F-1 to -16 (1993); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 43/1 - 43/115 (West Supp. 2000), 45/4-1 - 45/4-12 (West 1993
& Supp. 2000).
291 See Rebecca J. O'Neill, Surrogate Health Care Decisions for Adults in
Illinois-Answers to the Legal Questions That Health Care Providers Face on a
Daily Basis, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 411, 44042 (1998) (discussing the potential
conflicts between the Illinois Mental Health TreatmentPreferences DeclarationAct
and Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law).
2IFleischner, supra note 150, at 793. Query, however, whether a statute similar
to that which Alabama has enacted, which addresses terminal conditions as well as
withdrawal of hydration and nutrition--thus fairly clearly referencing physical
health care only-would be read to exclude mental health care decisions. See ALA.
CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -13 (1997). Alabama, however, like other states, has
potentially more than one generic statute on point. See id. § 26-1-2. Many states
have both durable power of attorney statutes and health care proxy statutes, each
of which could apply. Further, some states have specialized mental health advance
directive statutes, as well as guardian statutes. In short, the problem may be too
much statutory authority. For a discussion of competing statutes and conflicting
authority, see O'Neill, supra note 291, at 440-42. Not all commentators agree that
general advance directive statutes will workproperly forpsychiatric conditions. See
Stavis, supra note 138, at 57.
293 UN .HEALTH-CAREDECISIONS ACT, 9 (B) U.L.A. 143 (1999). Six states
have adopted this act since 1995: California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi,
and New Mexico. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 46004805 (West Supp. 2001); DEL.
CODEANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2518 (Supp. 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327E1 to -16
(Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-801 to -817 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-201 to -229 (1999 & Supp. 2000); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (Michie Supp. 1996).
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treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or otherwise affect
an individual's physical or mental condition."' ' The comments indicate
that health care is defined as broadly as possible and should be construed
that way.29s Capacity is defined as "an individual's abilityto understand the
significant benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health care and to
make and communicate a health-care decision."2 6 The Uniform Act
permits the appointment of a proxy or agent to make health-care decisions
that approve or disapprove programs ofimedication, thus codifying the right
to refuse.297 In its section on revocation, the Uniform Act requires a
principal to have capacity in order to execute a valid revocation.2 In the
state statutes, revocations are generally reserved to the competent or
capable principal.
299
There are some troubling statutory provisions. Many states set forth
circumstances under which the directive need not be followed.3 ° Some of
these exceptions have the effect of all but eviscerating the law. For
instance, several states allow the directive to be ignored in emergencies,
defined to include risk of harm to self.30 ' One of the purposes of advance
directives, however, is to give voice to patient autonomy in the face of
anticipated emergencies. Rendering an advance directive ineffective when
such an emergency occurs undercuts the reason for advance directives in
the first place.
B. Case Law
The statutes dealing with mental health advance directives are
relatively new and the case law interpreting them is sparse.3" Some courts,
294UNw. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONs ACT § 1(5), 9 (LB) U.LXA. 148 (emphasis
added).295 Id. § 1 cmt, 9 (I.B) U.L.A. 149.
296 Id. § 1(3), 9 (I.B) U.L.A. 148.
2
" Id. § l(6)(ii), 9 (I.B) U.L.A. 148.
298 Id. § 3(b), 9 (LB) U.LA. 155. The Uniform Act does specify, however, that
a person is presumed to have capacity. Id. § 11(b), 9 (I.B) U.L. 178.
299 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 327F-10 (1996).
3
1 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-807(e) (West 1998).
301 See, e.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 16, § 2508 (Supp. 2000).
3' There are reasons other than relatively recent statutes that explain the
undeveloped state ofthe case law. Marginalized and stigmatized clients, often poor,
or, if of means, estranged from family members, and without any guarantee of
counsel, may not have the wherewithal to litigate these issues on the appellate
level.
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however, have had a chance to rule on the issue. In re Rosa M.3°3 is the key
case in this area?" Although not addressing a mental health advance
directive executed pursuant to a statute, a New York state court gave
binding effect to a patient's written document refusing electroconvulsive
therapy.
305
Rosa M. was committed to a state psychiatric center on February 6,
1990.306 She was subjected to three rounds of electroconvulsive therapy,
presumably with her consent as required by state law. °7 On March 22,
1991, Ms. M. consented again to electroconvulsive therapy; she was, at that
time, indisputably competent.308 She withdrew that consent nineteen days
later and there was no indication that she was not equally competent at that
point.3 9 The clinic director sought a court order authorizing further
electroconvulsive therapy over Ms. M.'s written objection.310 In denying
the petition, the court recognized the fundamental right of individuals to
have the "final say" and declared that mentally ill persons were entitled to
the same status.31' As no one had demonstrated that Ms. M. lacked
capacity, she was entitled to have her say and to have that say bind the
medical personnel?
12
A 1997 Illinois appellate case, In reHatsuye T.,313 involved an eighty-
two-year-old woman who was diagnosed with severe psychotic
depression.3 14 Mrs. T. executed a durable power of attorney for health care,
naming a health care proxy.1 5 She laterwas approached by her doctor, who
303 In re Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
304 See PARRY, supra note 144, at 105.
o See Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d at 544-45.
306Id. at 544.
3
07 Id.
,o d.
309 See id. at 544-45.
310 Id. at 544.
311 Id. at 545.
3 12 
Id.
313 In re Hatsuye T., 689 N.E.2d 248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
3 14 I at 249.
315 Id. at 250. The statutory authority pursuant to which Mrs. T. appointed a
proxy was the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 45/4-1 - 45/4-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000), not the state's Mental Health
Treatment Preferences Declaration Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 43/1 -43/115
(West Supp, 2000). There is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the proxy was
not capable of rendering decisions involving mental health care. See Hatsuye T.,
689 N.E.2d at 249-54.
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told her that the only option other than electroconvulsive therapy was
placement in a nursing home, a statement that was clearly not true.3 6 In
response, Mrs. T. provided consent to electroconvulsivetherapy, which she
had previously declined to do, because she feared she would die in a
nursing home, as her husband had. 17 Mrs. T. then amended the power of
attorney to include instructions that prevented the proxy from consenting
to electroconvulsive therapy."' Following this, Mrs. T. was discharged and
returned to her home.3 19 Mrs. T.'s psychotic depression worsened five
months later and a petition to forcibly medicate was filed after Mrs. T. was
involuntarily committed?2 The court appointed a guardian and authorized
that guardian to consent to as many as ten electroconvulsive therapy
treatments over Mrs. T.'s objection, which had been explicitly expressed
in the durable power of attorney for health care.
32
On appeal, the court synthesized the power of attorney statute with the
guardianship statute.3 The court found that provisions of both laws gave
an agent appointed pursuant to the power of attorney law supremacy over
a guardian in matters covered by the durable power of attorney.3" Indeed,
the court found that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
appoint a guardian to consent to electroconvulsive therapy in view of the
validly executed durable power of attorney forhealth care.3 24 The court thus
found the guardianship order to be void.
3"
The doctor's statement to Mrs. T. concerning her options warrants
discussion. His statement illustrates the risk of coercion involved in these
cases.326 It is a risk at all levels and from all sides. Coercion is a concern
316 Hatsuye T., 689 N.E.2d at 250.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 See id. at 251.
323 Id.
324 See id. at 251-52.
325 Id. at 252.
326 See, e.g., MACARTHURRESEARCHNETWORKONMENTALHEALTHANDTHE
LAW, THE MACARTHUR COERCION STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1999),
http://ness.sys.virginia.edu/macarthur/coercion.html [hereinafter MACARTHUR
COERCION STUDY]. The study found that coercion is not limited to the legal status
of involuntary commitment; it can also occur in connection with "voluntary"
placements. Id. The feeling of coercion, then, is dependent not so much on the type
of placement but on whether negative pressures-such as threats-are used, as
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throughout the field of advance directives, and not limited to fear of doctor
or hospital staff coercion. Some mental health advocates fear that family
members may coerce persons with mental illness into signing advance
directives, consenting to treatment they do not want. On the other hand,
mental health professionals fear that advocates will persuade the mentally
ill to reject both needed and wanted prospective treatment. 27
The courts in Rosa M. and Hatsuye T. honored a competent patient's
future choice to refuse psychiatric treatment.3 Although there is nothing
in either case that indicated a risk of violence,329 which is a commonly cited
ground to seek a judicial countermand to an advance directive, the medical
personnel in each case sought electroconvulsive therapy and testified that
it was appropriate, notwithstanding the existence ofan advance directive.330
Indeed, in the Hatsuye T. case, it was the hospital's discomfort with the
power of attorney and its subsequent petition to the court for a guardian
that created the circumstances leading to a "no electroconvulsive therapy"
edict.33' Prior to the petition filed by the hospital, Mrs. T. had not forbidden
her proxy from consentingto electroconvulsive therapy.32 Had the hospital
recognized the appropriate authority of the proxy, it could have sought and
perhaps received consent for the therapy from the proxy.
333
opposed to positive pressures-such as persuasion-and whether the process used
is fair and the persons involved are genuinely concerned and respectful. Id.327 See Letter from Mark Heyrman, Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, University of
Chicago, to Justine A. Dunlap, visiting Director, Domestic Violence Clinic,
American University Washington College of Law (Aug. 1999) (on file with
author). Many advance directive statutes explicitly forbid coercion in the execution
of advance directives. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 327F-12 (1996).
321 Hatsuye T., 689 N.E.2d at252;In re RosaM., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544,545 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct 1991).
329 See Hatsuye T., 689 N.E.2d at 249-54; Rosa M, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 544-45.
330 Hatsuye T., 689 N.E.2d at 250; Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
331 See Hatsuye T., 689 N.E.2d at 250.
332 Id.
3 It is possible that the proxy was not even in effect, as there was no clear
assertion that Mrs. T. was not competent to give or withhold consent. See id. at
249-54. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary: the doctor sought her consent for
electroconvulsive therapy and only after it was refused did he go to court to seek
a guardian to grant him what his patient would not. Id. at 250. The doctor's action
is emblematic of studies showing that doctors often rush to a judgment of
incompetence when a patient disagrees with them. Presumably, Mrs. T.'s doctor
would have happily pronounced her competent if she had signed the
electroconvulsive therapy consent form as he had wished.
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In another Illinois case, In re Janet S.,33 an Illinois appellate court
reversed an order for involuntary administration of medication because the
state had failed to allege in its petition, as required by statute,3 5 that it had
made a good faith effort to ascertain whetherthe individual in question had
executed an advance directive pursuant to the Mental Health Treatment
Preference Declaration Act. 36 Illinois is a state with multiple laws in this
area and the legislature has made an attempt to coordinate the laws by
requiring that the petitioner in an action for forced administration of drugs
make an effort to see if an advance directive, which would clearly affect
and perhaps preempt a petition, has been completed?37 The Janet S. court
declaredthat it would strictly enforce procedural safeguards as a necessary
protection for an individual's liberty interest which is put at risk by the
possibility of a regime of forced medication.338
Of these three cases, only the third, In re Janet S., recites facts
suggesting that the person in question was of potential harm to others339
The involuntary treatment order for Janet S. was sought while she was held
on charges of aggravated battery and disorderly conduct after having been
determined not competent to stand trial." ° It is curious that in the two cases
in which an advance directive was given effect, In re Rosa M. and In re
Hatsuye T., the request was for electroconvulsivetherapy, not psychotropic
drugs, for persons whose diagnosis was depression, not schizophrenia. 14 1
This maybe the case because the courts, at least appellate courts,342 maybe
3
3 In re Janet S., 712 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
33 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-107(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
336 Janet S., 712 N.E.2d at 423-24. Some Illinois appellate courts hold that a
failure in the petition to allege such good faith efforts is harmless error. In re Len
P., 706 N.E.2d 104,107 (Ill. App. Ct 1999); In reMiller, 705 N.E.2d 144, 144 (1.
App. Ct. 1998). The Illinois Mental Health Treatment Preference Declaration Act
is found at 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 43/1 - 43/115 (West Supp. 2000).
337 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-107(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
338 Janet S., 712 N.E.2d at 424.
339 Id. at 423.
30Id.
11 The Hatsuye T court specified that Mrs. T.'s disease was "severe psychotic
depression with delusional features." In re Hatsuye T., 689 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Ill.
App..Ct. 1997). The court in Rosa M. did not disclose the nature of her mental
illness but it is likely to have been depression if the recommended treatment was
electroconvulsive therapy. See In re Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544, 544-45 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1991).
342 Both Janet S. and Hatsuye T. involved appellate reversals of lower court
decisions. Janet S., 712 N.E.2d at 423;Hatsuye T, 689 N.E.2d at 254. This leaves
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more comfortable giving voice to persons with depression as opposed to
those with schizophrenia. 3 It also suggests, however, that treating
facilities and personnel are not yet comfortable with autonomy that, when
exercised, leaves the individual untreated.
V. WHY THE HESIANCE?
A. Introduction
It is hard to argue seriously against autonomy.3"4 The list of autonomy
proponents 5 is daunting and even the U.S. Supreme Court has joined the
call in favor of autonomy in two cases regarding mental health.3" With this
strong philosophical, legal, and even psychological347 backdrop, what
explains the hesitance to embrace mental health advance directives?
one to wonder how many cases are also decided incorrectly but are not appealed,
thus leaving unvindicated the autonomy rights of persons with mental illness.
13 Public perceptions of these diseases are often not supported by data. For
instance, a person diagnosed with depression is more likely to be violent than a
person diagnosed with schizophrenia. MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON
MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW, MACARTHUR VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT
STUDY RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL REVIEW (1998), http://ness.sys.virginia.edu/
macarthur/violence_RespN1Lhtml [hereinafter MACARTHUR RESPONSE].
I" Some suggest, however, that "many" psychiatric advance directive
proponents are not really in favor of autonomy but are, rather, pushing separate
ideological agendas. Miller, supra note 283, at 743. It is further suggested that
these "extreme libertarians" are overrepresented in law review articles. Id. at
744.
11 The high regard for autonomy is longstanding and well-credentialed. Its
proponents include John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, John Stuart Mill,
and Immanuel Kant See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological
Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1707-15 (1992) (discussing the views of
Locke, Jefferson, Henry, Mill, and Kant). "Each is the proper guardian of his own
health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
12 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1978) (1859). Mill also stated that
"the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over... [another],
against his will, is to prevent harm to others." Id. at 9. See also WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87-90 (Greenwood Press 1980) (1958);
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
I See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990); supra Part H.B.3.
11 See Winick, supra note 345, at 1755-68.
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One reason why mental health advance directives have not been
endorsed as fully as end-of-life advance directives is no doubt the different
nature of the two conditions. Competent persons completing a standard
advance directive do so under legal and common sense presumptions of
rational thinking. 4s Competent persons afflicted by mental illness, by
contrast, operate under a cloud of suspicion regarding their capacity to
reason.349 Accordingly, there may be more hesitation to honor a mental
health advance directive because the individual's disease affects the brain.
Although it cannot be denied that the issue of competence is genuine and
must be addressed,50 it is quite likely that the concern is overblown.35'
Advocates for persons with mental illness endorse advance directives,
albeit with reservations. The fear of coercion, by family members or mental
health professionals, is of concern. This fear is strong enough such that
penalties including criminal sanctions against anyone who has coerced
someone into or out of signing an advance directive have worked their way
into several statutes.352
B. Fear
The hesitation to embrace mental health advance directives also stems
from society's general discomfort with mental illness and fear of persons
" Michael Perlin discusses the prejudices wrought in this area by the "use of
alleged'ordinary common sense."' Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice
Leaped Forth ". Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law
Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEmp. LEGAL ISSUEs 3, 4 (1999). Giving life to
these words is another commentator's view that "common sense" indicates that a
patient's right to autonomy be given a wide berth when it is consistent with good
practice and good economics. Stavis, supra note 138, at 49. Query whether that is
"autonomy" at all.
34 See supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
350 Because a common symptom of mental illness is denial, mental health
professionals will often say that the consumer lacks "insight"--meaning an
awareness of her illness. Miller, supra note 283, at 739.
351 Even sophisticated authors, familiar with mental illness, suggest that there
be special safeguards to ensure competence for the mentally ill who execute
advance directives. See Backlar, supra note 161, at 264-65. The way in which
society views the mentally ill-and perhaps in particular those who would be so
bold as to decline treatment-may have led some states to specify in their advance
directive statutes that the decision to make an advance directive should in no way
be construed as a sign of incompetence or incapacity. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 327F-4(c) (1993).
352 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 327F-12 (1993).
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who are mentally ill. After decades of expanding rights for persons with
mental illness, there has been, depending upon one's viewpoint, either a
backlash against or a reversal of the trend.23 Those who assert that the
rights movement has gone too far argue that it is absurd to permit those
who have illnesses affecting their thought processes3m to make binding
decisions about treatment.3 5 However, this concern can be answered by
adequately addressing the competence issue to ensure that only the
competent execute advance directives. There is no need for a wholesale
denial of the autonomy rights of persons with mental illness because a
minority are not competent.
It seems more likely that the predominant, if typically unarticulated,
concern is grounded in fear, stereotype, and prejudice. This prejudice was
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas,356 in which
the Court discussed the stigma that attached to involuntary commitments
and their adverse social consequences.3 7 The stigmatizing of persons with
mental illness is highlighted in the recent Surgeon General's report on
mental illness.5 8 This stigma leads to discrimination and abuse and
"deprives people of their dignity.""3 9
Professor Michael Perlin has written extensively of the evil of sanism
in the development and the application of mental disability law.360 He
3 3 See Treffert, supra note 234, at 770.
3s Not all mental illnesses are thought disorders. Some, such as bipolar
disorder, are classified as mood disorders. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICALMANUALOFMENTALDISORDERS 317 (4thed. 1994). Some, such
as schizo-affective disorder, are hybrids. Id. at 273.
315 See Miller, supra note 283, at 739 (arguing that psychiatric advance
directives should not be honored if a consumer does not acknowledge her mental
illness).
356 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
31 "One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of
treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma." Id. at 429.
311 U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS.,
MENTALHEALTH:AREPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(1999), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/summary.html.
359 U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL--CHAPrER 1 (1999),
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapterl/secl.html.
36 See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 348; Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism ", 46 SMU
L. REV. 373 (1992) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanism]; Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist andPretextualBases ofMentalDisability
Law, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994) [hereinafter
Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence].
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defines sanism as "an irrational prejudice, an 'ism,' of the same quality and
character of other prevailing prejudices such as racism, sexism, heterosex-
ism, and ethnic bigotry." 361 It is responsible, he asserts, for much of the
malfunctioning in the area of mental disability law.362 Perlin identifies
views that he describes as "a few of the sanist myths that dominate our
social discourse. 363 These myths include viewing the mentally ill as
dangerous, frightening, different, inhuman, lazy, deserving of segregation
and ridicule, and presumptively incompetent, especially regarding health
care decisions.3 4
Not only are persons with mental illness deemed incompetent to make
health care decisions, they are also considered unworthy to do so. It is as
if the right to autonomy and bodily integrity, must be earned and the
mentally ill have not-indeed, cannot-earn it. They cannot behave
responsibly with this right, the argument goes, so it is withheld from them.
Sanism is evident here because, although many non-mentally ill persons
behave irresponsibly and make bad choices, the right of autonomy is not
taken from them.365
Fear is certainly a piece of the sanist puzzle. This fear dictates seeing
a person with mental illness as "the other," as "them,"--meaning "surely
not us."31 The mentally ill are feared for several reasons. First, they may
behave differently, oddly, and outside the norm.367 Second, their actions
may move past the merely odd or bizarre and into the realm of the scary or
threatening. Further, one out of five persons will be diagnosed with mental
illness,31 thus the threat is all the more acute in view of its capacity to
become reality: any one of"us" could become one of "them." Even if we
dodge the odds, we are likely to have a daughter, a cousin, a best friend, or
a parent who does not. Given the genetic component of mental illness,
361 Perlin, Sanism, supra note 360, at 374.
362 See id. at 374-76.
363 Id. at 393.
36 See id. at 393-98.
36 Perlinpoints out that even when the myths are exposed, attitudes are unlikely
to change. Id. at 398. As the old adage goes, "Don't confuse me with the facts, I
have made up my mind."
3 6Id. at 389.
367 Incredibly, one author in the field has suggested that there is no right to
behave in a way that "might be offensive to public sensibilities." Stavis, supra note
138, at 47. But see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975)
(ridiculing a parallel notion).
368 U.S. PuB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., supra
note 359, at 3.
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having a parent-or, more stereotypically, a crazy aunt in the attic-with
mental illness is even more frightening.369
Mental illness is also feared because of the perception of loss of
control.370 This loss is frightening when one sees it in others and begins to
fear it, rationally or not, in one's own future. The slow pace at which
mental health advance directives have been embraced may well be
connected to this fear of loss of control and of others who are out of
control. Because persons with mental illness seem out of control, society
is reluctant to confer upon them the control and autonomy offered through
the instrument of an advance directive.
3 71
Notwithstanding decades of expanding rights for the mentally ill,
practical day-to-day occurrences in courts, hospitals, and community
treatment centers are far removed from legally established rights.37 Judges
and other decision-makers ignore or recast standards that have been legally
mandated but which seem to them inconsistent with standards of "alleged
'ordinary commonsense." 3 This disconnect also seems to be occurring
369 Stories, fictionalized or not, about family members with mental illness are
legion. See, e.g., Nicholas Dawidoff, MyFather's Troubles: A Memoir ofLove and
Madness, NEW YORKER, June 12,2000, at 58. This propinquity with mental illness
can be beneficial, if society can look behind the stereotypes and see such people as
human beings first, rather than as being neither more nor less than their mental
illness. As the supervising 'attorney at the Mental Health Law Clinic at the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law, I saw this in action. First, I
had to wrestle with my own stereotypes and fears of persons with mental illness,
my own dehumanization or-perhaps worse--infantilization of them. It is
remarkable and distressing how easy it is for even the lawyer, the "mouthpiece" of
the client, to insert her own views of the client's situation and to fail to give voice
to the client Second, I saw that the students (at least some of them), once past the
fear, had a chance at identifying with their clients, because the student already
knew and loved someone who was mentally ill. Of course, familiarity may have the
opposite effect.
370 Of course, mental illness is only one of several ways that people lose control.
Alcohol and drug use are the other obvious examples, but society does not deny
people who use (and perhaps abuse) substances the right to complete advance
directives.
371 Other theories of control and advance directives have been offered. It has
been suggested that psychiatry is about social control and denying persons
diagnosed with mental illness the right of free choice. Perling, supra note 11, at
197.
31 See Perlin, supra note 348, at 19-21.
373 Id. at 4. Perlin concedes that the gap between the law on the books and the
law in action is not unique to this field, but he asserts it is exacerbated by sanism
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in the area of advance directives. Despite a reasonably clear constitutional
right, a recent flurry of activity on the legislative front creating additional
rights, and decade-old predictions that the concept was about to take off,
mental health advance directives are still a hard sell.
C Violence
In Tarasoffv. Regents ofthe University of California'3 4 the California
Supreme Court found that a psychiatrist had a duty to warn a particular
third party about threats of harm issued against her by the psychiatrist's
patient? 7 The Tarasoffholding has been enlarged andbecome so powerful
that psychiatrists are often taught that it is the law, whether or not a similar
rule is in place in a particular jurisdiction.376 What is it about Tarasoffthat
has given it such resonance? Sanism certainly is one possible explanation;
it is commonly assumed that persons with mental illness are more violent
than are persons who do not carry such a diagnosis.
Violence-threatened or actual, self-directed or directed toward
others-is a likely concern of those hesitant to honor an advance directive
that refuses psychiatric treatment. To determine whether this fear of
violence is a rational justification for ignoring mental health advance
directives, one must determine whether the mentally ill are indeed more
violent or whether this is an example of unwarranted stereotype. The link
between persons with mental illness and dangerousness is, in at least one
and pretextuality. Id. at 20. Perlin defines pretextuality as "courts' acceptance
(either implicit or explicit) of testimonial dishonesty and their decisions to engage
in dishonest decision-making in mental disability law cases." Perlin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, supra note 360, at 373. Other authors have addressed the disconnect
between law and reality in this area, specifically civil commitments, and reached
a different conclusion. Darold Treffert, for example, suggests that this disparity is
a good and necessary thing, a practical recalibration as a result of extreme appellate
decisions in the area of mental health law. See Treffert, supra note 234, at 767-77.
Based upon my experience as a legal practitioner doing mental health work, I align
myself with Perlin here. The inadequacy of all players, illustrated by the cursory
nature of the hearings, the brusque and often disrespectful treatment of the client,
and the wholesale deference to doctors, demonstrates the pretextuality that Perlin
bemoans. Sadly, my experience is far from unique. See, e.g., Joel Haycock et al,
Mediating the Gap: Thinking About Alternatives to the Current Practice of Civil
Commitment, 20 NEW ENG. I ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFnEMENT 265 (1994).
374 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en band).
375 Id. at 353.376 See Perlin, supra note 348, at 20.
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way, not fanciful. Standards for involuntary civil commitments 3" and
release of insanity acquittees s78 make a combination of dangerousness and
mental illness a requisite for legal intervention. In cases that gamer public
attention, there is often violence and a corresponding legal consequence.
This, then, inextricably links two frightening elements-violence and
mental illness-in the mind of the public.
So, while perhaps explainable, the question remains whether the link
is fair. The last decade has yielded research in the area, most significantly
the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study. 79 Before the MacArthur
Study, there were various estimates of psychiatrists' ability to predict
dangerousness. One early study suggestedthat such expert predictions were
"less accurate than the flip of a coin, '380 although more recent studies have
altered that estimate 81
Predicting a particular individual's potential for violence is a different
task, however, from assessing a general correlation between mental illness
and violence. The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study examined
the incidence of violence committed by persons who had been hospitalized
for mental illness and then released to the community.382 The study
concludes that the prevalence of violence is about the same for the non-
mentally ill as it is for persons who were no longer hospitalized and who
had no signs of substance abuse.3 83 The results thus indicate that the
mentally ill pose a higher risk of violence only if they are abusing drugs or
alcohol." Substance abuse was reported in forty to fifty percent of the
31 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (holding that "a [s]tate
cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is
capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends").
378 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
379 MACARTHURRESEARCHNETWORKAND THELAw, MACARTHUR VIOLENCE
RISK STUDYEXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1999), http://ness.sys.virginia.edu/macarthur/
violence.html [hereinafter MACARTHUR VIOLENCE RISK STUDY].
380 Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 737 (1974).
m'See John Monaan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second
Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. . PSYCHIATRY 10 (1984); Randy K.
Otto, On the Ability ofMental Health Professionals to "Predict Dangerousness":
A Commentary on Interpretations ofthe "Dangerousness "Literature, 18 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 43 (1994).
3
92 MACARTUR VIOLENCE RISK STUDY, supra note 379.
383 Id.
3 " See id.; Kirk Heilbrun & Gretchen Witte, The MacArthur Risk Assessment
Study: Implicationsfor Practice, Research, and Policy, 82 MARQ.L.REV. 733,756
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former patient group,"'5 making the co-occurrence of substance abuse and
mental illness, with attendant higher risk of violence, significant.386 But
substance abuse by non-mentally ill persons also results in a greater
incidence of violence among that population38
The violence of persons with mental illness who are also abusing drugs
and alcohol is not any different in kind, i.e., no more severe or random,
from the violence committed by those who have not been hospitalized with
mental illness.88 Moreover, the study indicated, consistent with previous
studies, that persons with depression had higher levels of violence than did
those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia,38 9 a finding inconsistent with
general perceptions. This suggests that the culprit is drugs and alcohol, not
mental illness. Accordingly, no empirical data supports opposition to
mental health advance directives based upon fears of violence.3g
D. A Philosophical Divide
Lawyers are either the saints or the villains in the mental health field
as a result of their role in gaining rights for the mentally ill. With the
increase in these rights came the correlative decrease in simply acting upon
these individuals. Naturally, then, legal advocates praise advance direc-
tives, 9 ' which are a legal tool to implement the exercise of rights, whereas
doctors are more skeptical?92 It borders on the simplistic, of course, to
reduce the divide to lawyers versus doctors, but it often seems to play out
that way. It is fhir to generalize that lawyers are concerned with clients'
rights and doctors with patients' treatment.93 Looked at this way, the
(1999).
"I Heilbrun & Witte, supra note 384, at 747.
386 MACARTHUR VIOLENCE RISK STUDY, supra note 379.
3 87 Id.
388 Id.
389 MACARTHUR RESPONSE, supra note 343.
3o The MacArthur findings were surprising, insofar as they were contrary to
public perception. The National Review criticized them as "politically correct" in
their minimization of the violent tendencies of the mentally ill and as lending
ammunition to those who wished to repeal involuntary hospitalization laws. See
Sally Satel & D.J. Jaffe, Violent Fantasies, NAT'L REv., July 20, 1998, at 36. The
MacArthur study authors respondedwith vigor. See MACARTHURRESPONSE, supra
note 343, for the full response.
3 See, e.g., Winick, supra note 6, at 89.
39See, e.g., Paul Chodoff& Roger Peele, The Psychiatric Will ofDr. Szasz, 13
HASTINGS CENTERREP. 11 (1983).
3 But see Stavis, supra note 138, at 4-16. Professor Stavis has criticized the
development of rights for the mentally ill, suggesting that in the name of civil
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players on each side of the debate are predictable and, indeed, understand-
able, as the discussion regarding advance directives is very much about
rights versus treatment. Even in the face of this divide, however, some
mental health professionals have praised mental health advance
directives? 94 Use of this instrument will encourage patient involvement in
treatment, promote autonomy, and ensure better knowledge of the illness
through the process of counseling that should precede an advance
directive.395 Conversely, some legal experts acknowledge and laud the
potential therapeutic effect of an advance directive through which a
consumer chooses treatment rather than rejects it.
31
It is also true that each side appears and argues through its own bias;
neither can claim a corner on the truth.397 But if we know nothing else as
a result of this four-decade explosion of issues in mental health, it is that
both treatment and rights change rapidly and markedly.398 Accordingly, a
dose of humility on the part ofall contributing to this area is a medicine we
should voluntarily swallow.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mental health advance directives still hold potential for being a newly
fabled "third way." They are an instrument through which, in most cases,
rights, the courts have impeded treatment and diminished patient autonomy. See id.
at 2.
31 See Deborah S. Pinkney, Advance Directive Could Give Mentally Ill More
Treatment Control, AM. MED.NEWS, Dec. 16,1991, at 3; Marilyn K. Rosenson &
Agnes Marie Kasten, Another View of Autonomy: Arranging for Consent in
Advance, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIABULL. 1,1-3 (1991) (defendingUlysses contracts and
critiquing the self-paternalism argumentraised in opposition to advance directives).
3
" See Backlar, supra note 161, at 262.
31 See Stavis, supra note 138, at 72-75; Winick, supra note 6, at 81-86.
3
1 Dr. Robert Miller, for instance, in his critique of mental health advance
directives, lambasts lawyers (and libertarians) for promoting ideological agendas,
yet his article does nothing less than promote his ideologies. See Miller, supra note
283, at 745. Others have noticed this "excess of finger-pointing and blame-
attributing." See Perlin, supra npte 348, at 24.
39 Psychopharmacological treatment has moved forward in leaps and bounds.
The development of legal rights, however, has slowed for a variety of reasons.
There are fewer patients in psychiatric hospitals, for instance, thus reducing the
need for institutional litigation. See John W. Parry, Executive Summary and
Analysis, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 707, 707 (1997). There are
now restrictions on class actions brought by legal services lawyers and other
reasons that attribute to the legal slow-down. Id. Further, "there has been a
litigation deemphasis in favor of other advocacy methods, particularly non-class
action systems advocacy." Id.
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all involved parties can reach agreement.3 9 Most persons recognize both
the legal primacy and moral value of autonomy. Further, most persons
recognize that there is mental illness and that treatment, often through
psychopharmacology, can be valuable. Most also acknowledge, however,
that drug treatment can be ineffective and dangerous at its worst and yields
irksome side effects nearly all of the time. Finally, most people agree that
persons with mental illness are often competent to make decisions.
Mental health advance directives take advantage of these areas of
agreement. They permit persons with mental illness to assert their right to
autonomy while competent. This assertion of rights can permit persons
with mental illness to plan in advance their treatment choices for when they
might become incapable of making such choices. This act of planning is
more than an exercise in self-determination-it also has salutary therapeu-
tic effects. So far so good. Now comes the part where the agreement might
disintegrate, but a truce is still possible.' Some persons will choose
treatment; some persons will refuse it. Sometimes the same person will opt
for a little of each, or a modification of the treatment plan suggested-to
the consternation, no doubt, of those who propose it. But to choose is their
right and to be encouraged to choose while they are able may be our
responsibility-the families, the advocacy groups, the doctors and, yes, the
lawyers, who each see so clearly the solution but who, as of yet, have not
solved the problem.
39 If agreement is too sanguine a term, then perhaps a truce.
0 Hoping for a truce may signal either a capitulation or a recognition that the
truth is somewhere in the middle. In either case, the reach for a third way is
consistent with recent scholarship on therapeutic jurisprudence, which has been
described as seeking compromise or a "convergence of various interests." David
B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Culture ofCritique, 10 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 263, 273 (1999). Initially (and perhaps still) a bit skeptical of
therapeutic jurisprudence with its paternalistic ring, if acknowledging some merit
on each side of the debate puts me in its camp, I am happy to pitch my tent.
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